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COMPELLING IMAGES: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
EMOTIONALLY PERSUASIVE HEALTH CAMPAIGNS 
NADIA N. SAWICKI

 
ABSTRACT 
 Legislation requiring the display of emotionally compelling 
graphic imagery in medical and public health contexts is on the 
rise—two examples include the Food and Drug Administration’s 
recently abandoned tobacco labeling regulations, which would 
have imposed images of diseased lungs and cancerous lesions on 
cigarette packaging, and state laws requiring physicians to 
display and describe ultrasound images to women seeking 
abortions.  This Article highlights the disconnect between the 
constitutional challenges to these laws, which focus on the perils 
of compelling speakers to communicate messages with which they 
may disagree, and the public’s primary objections, which are 
grounded in ethical concerns about the state’s reliance on 
emotion to persuade.  This Article argues that, despite 
inconsistent judicial precedent in the tobacco and ultrasound 
contexts, concerns about the emotional impact of government-
mandated images on viewers can and should be incorporated in 
First and Fourteenth Amendment analyses.  In making this 
argument, the Article relies on the body of First Amendment 
jurisprudence in which the Supreme Court suggests that images 
are uniquely dangerous because they are less rational, less 
controllable, and more emotionally powerful than textual 
communications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In order to achieve its policy objectives, the government must speak.
1
  
Because the success of its policies depends on how persuasively the state 
communicates, policymakers and politicians have long sought ideas from 
the worlds of advertising and communications to improve the salience of 
government messages.  As a result, governments frequently use graphic 
images with emotional appeal—from highway posters featuring Smokey 
Bear
2
 to video game-style recruiting campaigns for the United States Armed 
Forces
3—to persuade citizens to act in support of public goals. 
This phenomenon is particularly striking in the realms of medicine and 
public health.  American public health campaigns have long relied on the 
use of emotionally stirring graphic imagery to persuade the public.  Early 
examples include a 1919 poster from the American Red Cross featuring the 
ghost of tuberculosis being pushed out of a home,
4
 and a 1944 United States 
War Department venereal disease warning depicting an attractive woman as 
“A Bag of Trouble.”5  Indeed, one could trace the history of American 
public health using posters from the United States Public Health Service 
alone.
6
  While this approach has traditionally been uncontroversial, two 
                                                          
 1.  See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (“[I]t is not easy to 
imagine how government could function if it lacked [the freedom to express its views].”); MARK 
G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN 
AMERICA 6 (1983) (describing the “transfer of information” as a “policy tool”); Joseph Blocher, 
Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 749–51 (2011) (discussing 
government speech as a means to inform, persuade, and foster debate); David Cole, Beyond 
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 681 (1992) (“The citizenry has an interest in knowing the government’s point 
of view, and the government has an interest in using speech to advance the programs and policies 
it enacts.”). 
 2.  Smokey Bear, the mascot of the United States Forest Service, has been used since 1944 
to educate the public about the dangers of forest fires.  Smokey Bear Campaign History, AD 
COUNCIL, http://www.smokeybear.com/vault/history_main.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). 
 3.  The U.S. Army has developed a series of video games for potential recruits to experience 
“what the Army has to offer without leaving your home—and have fun while doing it.”  
Downloads: Games, U.S. ARMY, http://www.goarmy.com/downloads/games.html (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2013).  The U.S. Army also created a television commercial targeted at video game 
players. U.S. Army Commercial Targeting Video Gamers, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XkKF4ZcqW14 (last updated June 8, 2007).  
 4.  Visual Culture and Public Health Posters: The Next to Go: Fight Tuberculosis, NAT’L 
LIBRARY OF MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visualculture/infectious04.html (last 
updated Sept. 8, 2011). 
 5.  Visual Culture and Public Health Posters: She May Be a Bag of Trouble, NAT’L 
LIBRARY OF MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visualculture/infectious18.html (last 
updated Sept. 8, 2011). 
 6.  See Visual Culture and Public Health Posters: Exhibition Introduction, NAT’L LIBRARY 
OF MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visualculture/introduction.html (last updated Sept. 8, 
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recent developments have brought the government’s use of graphic imagery 
in medical and public health contexts to the forefront of public debate. 
In 2011, the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
adopted tobacco labeling regulations, which required manufacturers to 
cover fifty percent or more of cigarette packaging with graphic images 
depicting the negative health consequences of smoking; selected images 
included photographs of diseased lungs, cancerous oral lesions, and 
cadavers.
7
  Notably, the FDA selected these images precisely because of 
their emotional impact, citing evidence that “messages that arouse 
emotional reactions” or “generate an immediate emotional response” are 
more likely to trigger behavioral changes.
8
  Tobacco manufacturers, suing 
to enjoin enforcement of these laws, publicly objected that the mandated 
warnings were inappropriate because they were “intended to elicit loathing, 
disgust, and repulsion.”9 
A second recent example of this phenomenon is the adoption of state 
laws requiring that a woman seeking an abortion view an ultrasound of her 
fetus and listen to her doctor’s description of the image before consenting to 
the procedure.
10
  Policymakers have suggested that viewing the fetal 
ultrasound will trigger maternal bonding instincts and feelings of love, in 
turn inspiring women who might otherwise choose abortions to carry their 
pregnancies to term.
11
  Critics, however, have challenged these laws as 
taking advantage of women’s emotions to influence their private medical 
decisions.
12
 
                                                          
2011) (revealing how public health posters can “provide an effective medium for communicating 
information about disease, identifying risk factors, and promoting behavioral change”). 
 7.  Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 
36,674 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). 
 8.  Id. at 36,635. 
 9.  Duff Wilson, U.S. Releases Graphic Images to Deter Smokers, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/health/policy/22smoke.html?_r=1& (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 10.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(b) (2008) (amended 2013) 
(requiring physicians performing abortions to display real-time sonograms and provide “a 
simultaneous and objectively accurate oral explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting” at 
least twenty-four hours before performing abortion); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a) (2011) 
(amended 2013) (requiring same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B) (2010) (requiring same); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 2011) (requiring same).  
 11.  Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First 
Amendment’s Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2393–94 
(2013) (quoting Texas Governor Rick Perry representing the Texas statute as a “critical step in our 
efforts to protect life” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 12.  See infra Part II.B. 
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Both the tobacco and ultrasound laws have been challenged on First 
Amendment grounds as unconstitutionally compelling speech.
13
  The 
ultrasound laws, which continue to face judicial scrutiny, also face 
Fourteenth Amendment challenges based on the right to reproductive 
privacy.
14
  In both arenas, circuit splits have called attention to the 
uncertainty surrounding the resolution of these important constitutional 
issues.
15
  While the FDA recently declined to petition the Supreme Court 
for review in the tobacco cases, suggesting that future rulemaking would 
render the legal issues moot,
16
 the conflicting precedent in the ultrasound 
context potentially puts this conflict in a position to reach the Supreme 
Court.
17
 
This Article makes a much needed interdisciplinary contribution to the 
existing literature on this topic by demonstrating that the constitutional 
challenges to these laws can be effectively bolstered by relying on well-
established ethical arguments about the dangers of emotional and arational 
persuasion,
18
 as well as scientific research suggesting that visual images 
                                                          
 13.  See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (tobacco); 
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 521 (6th Cir. 2012) (tobacco); 
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(abortion); Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (abortion), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 
345 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 14.  See Stuart, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 436; Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012) 
(per curium) (holding that the Oklahoma Ultrasound Act is facially unconstitutional under 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey). 
 15.  In the tobacco context, compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1222 (vacating 
the graphic warning requirements as unconstitutional and remanding to the FDA), with Disc. 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 531 (upholding constitutionality of graphic tobacco 
warnings).  In the ultrasound context, compare Lakey, 667 F.3d at 584 (vacating preliminary 
injunction of the Texas ultrasound law), with Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (granting preliminary 
injunction of North Carolina law). 
 16.  On October 26, 2012, tobacco companies petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari to resolve the circuit split.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 
509 (6th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012) (No. 12-521).  
After consultation with HHS and FDA, however, the Solicitor General decided not to seek 
Supreme Court review of the First Amendment issues raised by the Plaintiff cigarette 
manufacturers.  Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives (Mar. 15, 2013), available at 
http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2013/03/Ltr-to-Speaker-re-Reynolds-v-FDA.pdf.  On April 22, 
2013, the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. 
United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). 
 17.  On November 12, 2013, the Supreme Court declined to review the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court’s decision in Nova Health Systems v. Pruitt.  See supra note 14.  The contrasting decisions 
of the Fifth Circuit in Lakey and the Middle District of North Carolina in Stuart, which was 
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, however, remain in conflict. 
 18.  For a more thorough discussion of what constitute arational methods of persuasion, see 
Nadia N. Sawicki, Ethical Limitations on the State’s Use of Arational Persuasion 6 (Loyola Univ. 
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play an important role in triggering emotional responses.
19
  The Article first 
highlights the substantial concerns that scholars of medical and public 
health ethics have raised about the government’s use of emotionally 
persuasive imagery to achieve its policy goals
20—a normative objection 
which has, to date, received little attention in legal literature.
21
  Second, the 
Article looks to social science research demonstrating that vivid images are 
more likely to trigger emotional responses than are verbal communications, 
and argues that this empirical work about the connection between images, 
emotions, and decisionmaking ultimately reinforces ethicists’ concerns 
about emotional persuasion in image-based health campaigns.
22
 
Taken together, these two lines of scholarship provide valuable 
support to opponents of the tobacco and ultrasound campaigns.  By drawing 
on Supreme Court precedent about the power of images in First 
Amendment law, as well as judicial commentary in the tobacco and 
ultrasound cases, this Article argues that there are powerful reasons for 
considering the emotional impact of the tobacco and ultrasound images as 
relevant to their constitutionality.
23
  Further, it develops concrete arguments 
that litigants can use to build concerns about emotion persuasion into 
existing constitutional standards—including the tests for compelled 
commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
                                                          
Chicago School of Law, Research Paper No. 2013-004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2286396. 
 19.  See infra Part V.B.1. 
 20.  See generally J. S. Blumenthal-Barby & Hadley Burroughs, Seeking Better Health Care 
Outcomes: The Ethics of Using the “Nudge,” 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2012) (examining the 
ethical considerations when behavioral economics and psychology are used to “nudge” people 
toward making particular health decisions); Catherine Mills, Images and Emotion in Abortion 
Debates, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 61, 61 (2008) [hereinafter Mills, Images and Emotion] (suggesting 
that greater attention be made to the “emotive or affective impact of images on ethical intuitions”); 
John Rossi & Michael Yudell, The Use of Persuasion in Public Health Communication: An 
Ethical Critique, 5 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 192, 193 (2012) (arguing that the use of persuasive 
health communication “infringes upon autonomy, . . . leads to inadvertent harm, and . . . is 
objectionable on principle”).  For arguments raised in the abortion context in particular, see 
CATHERINE MILLS, FUTURES OF REPRODUCTION: BIOETHICS AND BIOPOLITICS 102–03 (2011) 
[hereinafter FUTURES OF REPRODUCTION] (exploring the effect of ultrasound on the experience of 
pregnancy, and discussing the ethical implications of fetal imaging); Nick Hopkins et al., 
Visualising Abortion: Emotion Discourse and Fetal Imagery in a Contemporary Abortion Debate, 
61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 393, 402 (2005) (arguing that it is “erroneous to depict the appearance of 
emotion discourse in social movement rhetoric as evidencing an attempt to circumvent rational 
deliberation”); Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the 
Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 265 (1987) (exploring the impact of ultrasound 
imaging on consciousness of pregnant women and considering the implications of fetal images on 
feminist theory and practice). 
 21.  See infra Part V.A. 
 22.  See infra Part V.B.1. 
 23.  See infra Part V. 
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Service Commission of New York
24
 and Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel;
25
 strict scrutiny of compelled personal speech;
26
 tests for 
protecting captive audiences from unwanted speech;
27
 and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey’s28 undue burden test 
for protecting reproductive privacy.
29
  While recognizing that ethical claims 
about the emotional impact of images may not ultimately trump utilitarian 
concerns about the effectiveness of policy messages and the merits of these 
policy goals, this Article concludes that when the government relies on 
image-based emotional messaging to achieve its policy goals without 
carefully considering its impact on viewers, important ethical 
considerations are lost.
30
 
Part II of the Article describes the two public health campaigns at 
issue.  It demonstrates that both the FDA’s tobacco labeling laws and state 
abortion ultrasound requirements were passed to persuade behavior change 
at least in part through emotional persuasion, and emphasizes that much of 
the public criticism of these laws revolves around concerns about their 
emotional impact. 
Part III provides a fuller explanation of the objection to emotional 
persuasion, defining it as the claim that, generally, those seeking to 
persuade others—particularly those persuaders in positions of superior 
power—ought to do so primarily on the basis of reasoned argument rather 
                                                          
 24.  447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (establishing that a state may regulate commercial speech 
where the “governmental interest is substantial,” the regulation at issue “directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted,” and where the regulation “is not more extensive than is necessary 
to serve that interest”). 
 25.  471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that the rights of commercial speakers “are adequately 
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in 
preventing deception of consumers”).   
 26.  See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713, 716 (1977) (holding that a state’s 
interests must be “compelling” to “require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an 
ideological message by displaying it on his private property,” especially when the end could be 
more narrowly achieved).  
 27.  See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (“The First Amendment permits the 
government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the ‘captive’ audience cannot avoid the 
objectionable speech.” ). 
 28.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 29.  Id. at 877 (finding that pre-viability regulations of abortion do not violate a woman’s 
Fourteenth Amendment right to reproductive privacy so long as they do not place substantial 
obstacles in the path of the woman seeking abortion). 
 30.  See also Sawicki, supra note 18, at 13.  It is for this reason, also, that this Article does not 
address the merits of the substantive policies the government is seeking to pursue.  While 
audiences may disagree as to whether reducing smoking rates and abortion rates are, as a general 
matter, worthwhile goals for the state to pursue, the purpose of this Article is to bring to light 
ethical concerns that are relevant regardless of one’s agreement or disagreement with the 
substance of the message the state conveys. 
 464 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:458 
 
than by appealing to our basic instincts, stereotypes, or emotions.  Reason 
and emotion, of course, are not firm categories, but rather ends on the 
spectrum of human decisionmaking.  That said, the case for the primacy of 
rational argument has a long-standing basis within the theories of 
deliberative democracy, social psychology, communications ethics, and 
medical ethics, and has been voiced by thinkers such as Aristotle, Immanuel 
Kant, and Jürgen Habermas. 
Part IV introduces the principles of First and Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence that federal courts have applied in the tobacco and ultrasound 
contexts thus far—R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA31 and Discount 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States
32
 (tobacco); and Stuart v. 
Huff
33
 and Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. 
Lakey
34
 (ultrasound).  It parses the precedential decisions on these topics 
and highlights the few situations in which judicial decisionmakers have 
responded to litigants’ concerns about emotional persuasion.  There is, 
unfortunately, no consistent precedent on this issue—only one court has 
incorporated an objecting party’s concerns about the emotional impact of 
compelled speech explicitly in its analysis,
35
 as have two judges in 
dissenting or nonprecedential opinions.
36
 
Finally, Part V uses the themes identified in the previous sections to 
outline four methods by which concerns about emotionally persuasive 
imagery might be brought into the constitutional analysis, and offers a 
broader theoretical grounding for such a move by highlighting the unique 
nature of images in constitutional doctrine.
37
  Relying on Amy Adler’s work 
                                                          
 31.  696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 32.  674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 33.  834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 34.  667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 35.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1216–17 (explaining that graphic tobacco 
warnings “do not constitute . . . ‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ information” but are rather 
“unabashed attempts to evoke emotion”).  
 36.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, 
J., dissenting); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 
2012 WL 373132 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (Sparks, J.). 
 37.  See infra Part V.B.1–4 (arguing that (1) image-based messages communicated by the 
state run the risk of violating First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional tests requiring that 
compelled communication be factual, truthful, non-misleading, and uncontroversial; (2) 
campaigns that communicate factual messages more directly may be a more tailored means of 
achieving government goals than relying on campaigns with image-based messaging; (3) 
ultrasound image requirements that make it more difficult for a woman to exercise free choice 
may run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections of reproductive privacy; and (4) image-
based emotional campaigns might violate the captive audience doctrine).  
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on the First Amendment’s treatment of images,38 Part V argues that 
Supreme Court precedent in a variety of contexts has often understood 
image-based communications to be less rational, less controllable, more 
emotionally powerful, and therefore potentially more dangerous than 
words. 
Litigants and public commentators in the tobacco and ultrasound 
challenges have drawn attention to the emotional impact of the images that 
are being communicated, via unwilling third parties, by the state.  
Currently, however, there is an imperfect fit between these concerns and the 
way in which courts have analyzed the constitutional issues.  This Article 
provides an interdisciplinary framework for drawing a tighter fit between 
law, ethics, and social science—one that will hopefully guide litigants in the 
cases currently winding their way toward the Supreme Court, as well as 
policymakers considering such laws in the future. 
II.  THE EMOTIONAL RESONANCE OF IMAGE-BASED HEALTH CAMPAIGNS 
Recently, the National Institutes of Health and the United States 
National Library of Medicine collaborated in order to present a web-based 
exhibition of public health campaigns throughout American history, titled 
“Visual Culture and Public Health Posters.”39  The introduction to the 
exhibit features a quote from William H. Helfland, consultant to the 
National Library of Medicine and collector of medical ephemera: “Posters 
have been a powerful force in shaping public opinion because 
propagandists have long known that visual impressions are extremely 
strong.  People may forget a newspaper article but most remember a 
picture.”40 
The use of graphic and emotionally stirring imagery to encourage 
citizens to make choices that the state believes are in the interest of public 
health is by no means a historical phenomenon, however.  Two recent 
developments, described herein, have heightened public consciousness of 
the state’s use of vivid imagery to persuade.  Unlike their historical 
counterparts, which were relatively uncontroversial, image-based 
                                                          
 38.  Amy Adler, The First Amendment and the Second Commandment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 41 (2012). 
 39.  Visual Culture and Public Health Posters, NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visualculture/index.html (last updated July 10, 2012); see also 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS: GETTING THE MESSAGE ACROSS (2009) 
[hereinafter PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS] (collecting post-WWI international public health 
posters). 
 40.  NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., TO YOUR HEALTH: AN EXHIBITION OF POSTERS FOR 
CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES 14 (1990), available at 
https://archive.org/stream/9400022.nlm.nih.gov/9400022#page/n1/mode/2up. 
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campaigns in tobacco labeling and abortion informed consent have 
encountered fierce opposition. 
A.  Graphic Tobacco Labeling 
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, passed in 
2009, requires that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services “issue regulations that require color graphics depicting the 
negative health consequences of smoking” on tobacco packaging.41  In 
2011, the FDA published a Final Rule,
42
 selecting nine graphic images for 
inclusion on cigarette labeling, including images of: 
a man exhaling cigarette smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his 
throat; a plume of cigarette smoke enveloping an infant receiving 
a kiss from his or her mother; a pair of diseased lungs next to a 
pair of healthy lungs; a diseased mouth afflicted with what 
appears to be cancerous lesions; a man breathing into an oxygen 
mask; a bare-chested male cadaver lying on a table, and featuring 
what appears to be post-autopsy chest staples down the middle of 
his torso; a woman weeping uncontrollably; [] a man wearing a t-
shirt that features a ‘no smoking’ symbol and the words ‘I 
QUIT’; . . . [and] a stylized cartoon . . . of a premature baby in an 
incubator.
43
 
These images were required to be placed on “at least 50 percent of the area 
of the front and rear panels” of cigarette packaging as of September 22, 
2012.
44
 
The FDA selected these images and associated textual warnings 
precisely because of their emotional impact.  Citing evidence that messages 
“generat[ing] an immediate emotional response” are more likely to trigger 
behavioral changes,
45
 the FDA noted that the selected images “elicited 
                                                          
 41.  Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a), 123 
Stat. 1776, 1845 (2009) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. 1333 (2010)). 
 42.  Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 
36,628 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). 
 43.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41–42 (D.D.C. 2011), vacated, 
696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 44.  Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,674.  
The FDA regulations comply with Article 11 of the WHO Framework on Tobacco Control, which 
requires that tobacco packaging in signatory states carry health warnings that are “50% or more, 
but no less than 30%, of the principal display areas.” Conference of the Parties, Guidelines for 
Implementation of Article 11 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at 3, WHO 
FCTC/COP3(10) (2008).  The United States signed the WHO Framework; however, it was not 
sent to the Senate for ratification.  Kevin Outterson, Smoking and the First Amendment, 365 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2351, 2353 (2011). 
 45.  Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,635. 
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significant impacts on the [emotional and cognitive] salience measures” and 
thus were more likely to cause consumers to change their behavior.
46
 
Whether the FDA’s claims that graphic tobacco warnings help reduce 
smoking rates are correct is, however, a matter of dispute.  In its 
rulemaking, the FDA cited numerous studies about the effects of graphic 
health warnings in Canada, concluding that such warnings are “effective in 
conveying the health risks of smoking, influencing consumer awareness of 
these risks, and affecting smoking intentions.”47  In contrast, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in R.J. 
Reynolds held that the evidence presented by the FDA did not support this 
conclusion.
48
  Scholarly reviews of the evidence regarding the effectiveness 
of antitobacco campaigns have likewise reached mixed or uncertain 
results.
49
 
Much of the public opposition to the new FDA regulations emphasizes 
the emotional impact of the mandated graphic images.  An article in Albany 
Law Review about the new tobacco labels begins with the following 
dramatic statement: 
Picture this: the upper body of an anonymous man, cigarette in 
hand, mouth parted in shame, as he exhales the ominous white 
smoke of his relentless habit through the black tracheotomy in the 
small of his neck. . . .  Try to envision: lips pulled back to reveal a 
crooked, rotting set of stained teeth, or what is left of them, with a 
crimson, flesh-eating wound, relentlessly devouring the raw skin 
surrounding it.
50
 
                                                          
 46.  Id. at 36,639. 
 47.  Id. at 36,633.  
 48.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“FDA failed 
to present any data—much less the substantial evidence required under the APA—showing that 
enacting their proposed graphic warnings will accomplish the agency’s stated objective of 
reducing smoking rates.”). 
 49.  Compare Jeremy Kees et al., Understanding How Graphic Pictorial Warnings Work on 
Cigarette Packaging, 29 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 265, 270 (2010) (citing U.S. studies showing 
favorable effects), with Matthew C. Farrelly et al., Youth Tobacco Prevention Mass Media 
Campaigns: Past, Present, and Future Directions, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL i35, i40 (2003) 
(demonstrating mixed effectiveness of state and national campaigns, and noting the difficulty of 
separating out the impact of marketing campaigns from other anti-smoking measures). 
 50.  Danielle Weatherby & Terri R. Day, The Butt Stops Here: The Tobacco Control Act’s 
Anti-Smoking Regulations Run Afoul of the First Amendment, 76 ALB. L. REV. 121, 121–22 
(2012); see also Stephanie J. Bennett, Paternalistic Manipulation Through Pictorial Warnings: 
The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act, 81 MISS. L.J. 1909, 1910 (2012) (“Imagine visiting your neighborhood grocery store 
to buy snacks and beer for a special occasion.  On the snack aisle, you select a box of Oreos from 
the middle shelf.  On the cookie package, you see an image of a pallid male cadaver, his autopsy 
incision bound together by thick staples and black thread.”). 
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Scholars are not the only ones struck by the emotional impact of the 
FDA’s graphic warning labels; countless media articles refer to the images 
selected by the FDA as “disgusting,”51 “gross,”52 and “shocking.”53  
Representatives of the tobacco industry have similarly called them 
“ghoulish,” “grisly,” and “ghastly.”54  A recent qualitative study of public 
reactions to the FDA images reported one participant’s response to the 
image of a man smoking through a tracheotomy hole: “Oh my God! . . .  I 
can’t even look at that again.”55 
Unsurprisingly, the new labeling requirements faced substantial legal 
challenges before their effective date—numerous tobacco manufacturers 
and marketers raised First Amendment claims, arguing that the mandatory 
inclusion of graphic warnings on cigarette packaging constitutes 
unconstitutional compelled commercial speech.  The two federal appeals 
courts that analyzed the FDA labeling requirements, however, reached 
opposing conclusions.  In March 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
Western District of Kentucky’s decision to uphold the graphic warning 
requirements.
56
  Just one month later, however, the D.C. Circuit affirmed 
the District of D.C.’s grant of summary judgment to R.J. Reynolds.57 
On October 26, 2012, a group of tobacco companies petitioned the 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to resolve the circuit conflict;
58
 the 
petition for certiorari was denied on April 22, 2013.
59
  The Department of 
Justice announced in March 2013 that it would not seek Supreme Court 
                                                          
 51.  Casey Chan, Judge Says Putting Disgusting Warning Pictures on Cigarette Boxes Is a 
Violation of Free Speech, GIZMODO (Nov. 8, 2011, 1:20 PM), 
http://gizmodo.com/5857530/judge-says-putting-disgusting-warning-pictures-on-cigarette-boxes-
is-a-violation-of-free-speech; Laura Stampler, Here Are the Disgusting Images a Court Just 
Mandated for All Cigarette Packs, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2012, 1:43 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/here-are-the-disgusting-images-a-court-just-mandated-for-all-
cigarette-packs-2012-3?op=1#ixzz29TkkTu6W. 
 52.  Thomas J. Glynn, Ewwww, That’s Gross! A New Era in U.S. Cigarette Labeling, 
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY (June 22, 2011), 
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/news/expertvoices/post/2011/06/22/ewwww-thats-gross!-a-new-
era-in-us-cigarette-labeling.aspx. 
 53.  Paul Waldman, The Ick Factor, AMERICAN PROSPECT (June 23, 2011), 
http://prospect.org/article/ick-factor. 
 54.  See Glynn, supra note 52. 
 55.  Paul L. Reiter et al., Appalachian Residents’ Perspectives on New U.S. Cigarette 
Warning Labels, 37 J. CMTY. HEALTH 1269, 1274 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518, 568–69 (6th Cir. 
2012).   
 57.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 58.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), 
petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012) (No. 12-521). 
 59.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). 
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review of the First Amendment challenges.
60
  Moreover, the Attorney 
General of the United States noted that the FDA “remains free to conduct 
new rulemaking proceedings under the Act, and [the FDA] can address 
issues identified by the court of appeals.”61  He further stated that the 
Department of Health and Human Services plans to “undertake research to 
support a new rulemaking consistent with the Tobacco Control Act.”62 
B.  Ultrasound Display Prior to Abortion 
The pro-life movement
63
 has long relied on the use of graphic imagery 
to advocate against abortion.  From the influential 1984 documentary The 
Silent Scream to images of aborted fetuses displayed by protesters outside 
Planned Parenthood, many abortion opponents use images meant to invoke 
fear and shame in order to persuade women to “choose life.”64  In recent 
years, however, the anti-abortion movement moved away from such 
negative appeals.
65
  Rather than seeking to shame or horrify women into 
continuing their pregnancies, pro-life advocates and their legislative 
supporters recognized and harnessed the power of positive emotions that 
fetal imagery can trigger.
66
 
Piggybacking on this shifting trend, some states require that, as part of 
the informed consent process, women seeking abortions review an 
                                                          
 60.  Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 16. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  There is a vigorous debate within the reproductive rights community with respect to 
terminology: whether to use “pro-life” (the term most commonly used by opponents of the 
women’s right to choose abortion) or “anti-choice” (the preference of many supporters of 
women’s reproductive choice).  I use the term “pro-life” throughout this Article, not as an 
endorsement of any political position, but merely because this term has a longer history and tends 
to be more widely recognized among commentators on issues relating to reproductive rights. 
 64.  See Drew Halfmann & Michael P. Young, War Pictures: The Grotesque as a Mobilizing 
Tactic, 15 MOBILIZATION: AN INT’L QUARTERLY 1, 13–19 (2010) (noting that “‘photographic 
evidence . . . transcends language and logic’” to “unveil the violence of abortion”); Hopkins et al., 
supra note 20, at 396 (“A key feature of contemporary anti-abortion campaigns is their use of fetal 
imagery . . . .”); Keighley, supra note 11, at 2396–97 (explaining that, using ultrasound 
technology, The Silent Scream depicts what appears to be a real abortion of a twelve-week old 
fetus, thus presenting both graphic and unsettling propaganda against abortion). 
 65.  This move may also be driven by popular opposition to public images of disgust.  See 
PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS, supra note 39, at iv, 1 (noting that negative moralizing messages 
have gradually evolved toward more positive methods, including humor); Hopkins et al., supra 
note 20, at 396 (describing the rejection of a U.K. television ad featuring aborted fetuses on the 
grounds that it “offend[ed] standards of taste and decency”). 
 66.  Paul Lauritzen, Visual Bioethics, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 50, 51 (2008) (“Rather than seeking 
to induce guilt and fear by showing pregnant women grisly images of aborted fetuses, many 
‘pregnancy crisis centers’ strive to foster hope and a sense of caring by displaying images or 
models of intact fetuses.”). 
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informational pamphlet provided by the state;
67
 the pamphlet typically 
includes color images of fetuses at various stages of development.
68
  In 
recent years, a more controversial requirement adopted by state legislators 
requires that a physician performing an abortion first either perform an 
ultrasound, or offer the woman the opportunity to have an ultrasound.
69
  
Louisiana, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin, however, 
have gone even further—these states require that the medical provider 
conduct an ultrasound display and describe the image to the patient, even if 
the patient wishes not to see the image or hear the description.
70
  The 
medical provider may also be required to make the fetal heartbeat audible to 
                                                          
 67.  See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(2)(D) (West 2010) 
(requiring a physician to provide a pregnant woman seeking an abortion with printed materials 
provided by the Texas Department of Health). 
 68.  See generally A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW (Tex. Dep’t of Health ed., 2003), available 
at http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/wrtk/pdf/booklet.pdf (describing the information to be included in 
the pamphlet that Texas physicians are required by law to make available to women seeking 
abortions); see also Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less 
Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 23 (2011) (discussing the Texas Department of Health 
brochure and noting its apparent partiality to the state’s preferences). 
 69.  See State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE 
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf.  Five states 
(Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wisconsin) require an abortion provider to 
perform an ultrasound, and to show and describe the image to the woman seeking an abortion, 
prior to the procedure.  Id.  In North Carolina and Oklahoma, however, these controversial 
ultrasound requirements have been held unenforceable and enjoined, respectively, per court 
decision.  Id.  Seven states (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, and 
Virginia) require the doctor to perform an ultrasound, but only offer the woman seeking an 
abortion the opportunity to view the image.  Id.   
 70.  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(c) (2008) (amended 2012) (requiring that 
the physician “display the screen which depicts the active ultrasound images so that the pregnant 
woman may view them” and “provide a simultaneous and objectively accurate oral explanation of 
what the ultrasound is depicting”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a) (2011) (amended 2013) 
(requiring that the physician “perform an obstetric real-time view of the unborn child on the 
pregnant woman,” “provide a simultaneous explanation of what the display is depicting,” and 
“display the images so that the pregnant woman may view them”), preliminary injunction granted 
by Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B) 
(West 2004) (requiring that the physician “perform an obstetric ultrasound on the pregnant 
woman,” “provide a simultaneous explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting,” and “display 
the ultrasound images so that the pregnant woman may view them”), overruled by Nova Health 
Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 
2011) (requiring that the physician “displays the sonogram images in a quality consistent with 
current medical practice in a manner that the pregnant woman may view them,” and “provides, in 
a manner understandable to a layperson, a verbal explanation of the results of the sonogram 
images”), upheld by Tex. Med. Providers v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 253.10 (West 2013) (requiring that the physician “provide [an] . . . oral explanation to the 
pregnant woman during the ultrasound of what the ultrasound is depicting,” and “display the 
ultrasound images so that the pregnant woman may view them”). 
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the patient.
71
  In the case of a patient unwilling to view the mandated 
images or listen to the mandated disclosure, the statutes explicitly permit 
the patient to avert her eyes or avoid listening without being subjected to (or 
subjecting the physician to) any penalty.
72
  The statutes do not detail how, 
precisely, a patient would be able to avoid listening to the physician’s 
description of the fetal characteristics other than by shutting her eyes and 
closing off her ears. 
Laws requiring women seeking abortions to view fetal imagery are 
heralded by pro-life advocates as a valuable supplement to the traditional 
informed consent process,
73
 which typically requires that physicians 
disclose the risks, benefits, and alternatives to any medical procedure a 
patient is about to undergo.
74
  Many proponents, however, are more explicit 
about the fact that the true purpose of these laws is to dissuade women from 
choosing abortion.
75
  Texas Governor Rick Perry, for example, described 
Texas’s abortion ultrasound law as a “critical step in our efforts to protect 
life.”76  Focus on the Family, a Christian ministry dedicated to promoting 
traditional family values, contends that “‘when a woman considering 
abortion can see her baby and hear the tiny heartbeat, she’s much more 
likely to choose life.’”77  Even some supporters of abortion rights, including 
Dr. Philip Stubblefield, former Board President of the National Abortion 
Federation, concede that a “‘small percentage’” of women seeking 
abortions might choose not to abort after viewing a consent form 
“‘describing the embryo in terms of size and mass at certain times, and 
                                                          
 71.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D) (2008) (amended 2012) (mandatory); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(D) (West 2011) (mandatory); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 188.027.1(4) (2011) (optional); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2) (2011) (amended 
2013) (optional). 
 72.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D)(3)(b) (2008) (amended 2013) (“A pregnant 
woman may choose not to view the ultrasound images required to be provided to and reviewed 
with the pregnant woman as provided for under this Section.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(b) 
(2011) (amended 2013) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a pregnant woman 
from averting her eyes from the displayed images or from refusing to hear the simultaneous 
explanation and medical description.”). 
 73.  Critics of these laws, however, question proponents’ arguments that the laws are merely 
an extension of traditional informed consent doctrine.  See Sawicki, supra note 68, at 10–18 
(describing informed consent-based objections to abortion disclosure laws). 
 74.  Sawicki, supra note 68, at 6–10. 
 75.  See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social 
Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2008) (“There is little 
question that the goal of many of these informed consent laws is dissuading women from pursuing 
abortions, and they are likely somewhat successful.”); Keighley, supra note 11, at 2392–95 
(discussing statutory language and legislative history supporting this point). 
 76.  Keighley, supra note 11, at 2393–94. 
 77.  Id. at 2400 (quoting Option Ultrasound: Revealing Life to Save Life, FOCUS ON THE 
FAMILY (May 31, 2012), http://www.heartlink.org/pdf/DonorOUPUpdate.pdf). 
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relating times at which heartbeat, movement and full development is 
reached.’”78 
Pro-life advocates support these claims by arguing that viewing a 
representation of a fetus will trigger maternal instincts and mother-child 
bonding, thereby reducing the likelihood that a woman will ultimately 
choose abortion.
79
  This hypothesis was first proposed in a 1983 
commentary in the New England Journal of Medicine.
80
  While there is 
some evidence to support the theory of early initiation of fetal bonding in 
the context of planned pregnancies,
81
 there is no scientific support for this 
proposition in the context of unplanned pregnancies.  The only study 
directly targeting this question found that of the women who viewed 
ultrasounds in anticipation of abortion, none changed their minds and many 
viewed the ultrasound as a generally positive experience.
82
  Another study 
                                                          
 78.  Daniel Avila, The Right to Choose, Neutrality, and Abortion Consent in Massachusetts, 
38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 511, 513–14 (2005) (quoting Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. 
Bellotti, 499 F. Supp. 215, 218–19 (D. Mass. 1980), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 641 F.2d 
1006 (1st Cir. 1981)). 
 79.   For further detail on the argument that fetal images are aimed at fostering maternal 
emotions, see JANELLE S. TAYLOR, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE FETAL SONOGRAM: TECHNOLOGY, 
CONSUMPTION, AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 80 (2008) (noting that “[c]laims regarding 
ultrasound’s capacity to promote maternal bonding . . . make regular public appearances in the 
arguments put forth by people working to try to shape the ways ultrasound is used,” and that 
“[s]ome of these people also seek to enlist ultrasound in their struggles to end abortion”); Carol 
Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 351, 396–97 (2008) (arguing that ultrasound laws are grounded in the idea that 
“the fetal image will overwhelm the decision to abort by triggering something like a primitive 
maternal instinct”); Lauritzen, supra note 66, at 54 (describing The Silent Scream as “facilitating 
an emotional identification between the viewer and the fetus”); Mills, Images and Emotion, supra 
note 20, at 62 (“[T]here is thought to be something in the process or act of seeing the fetus that 
impacts on a woman’s response to an emotional and ethical relationship with the fetus.”). 
 80.  John C. Fletcher & Mark I. Evans, Maternal Bonding in Early Fetal Ultrasound 
Examinations, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 392, 392 (1983) (theorizing that viewing the fetus “may 
also influence the resolution of any ambivalence toward the pregnancy itself” and “may thus result 
in fewer abortions”). 
 81.  Researchers have concluded that having an ultrasound is generally a positive experience 
for women with planned pregnancies.  See id. at 392 (offering anecdotal evidence that the 
ultrasound experience is “likely to increase the value of the early fetus” in a planned pregnancy); 
M. A. Rustico et al., Two-Dimensional vs. Two-Plus Four-Dimensional Ultrasound in Pregnancy 
and the Effect on Maternal Emotional Status: A Randomized Study, 25 ULTRASOUND IN 
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 468, 470 (2005) (“The physical and kinesthetic awareness of the 
fetus gives rise to an experience that in nature has been referred to as maternal–fetal attachment.”).  
Indeed, a whole industry has arisen around 3D and 4D ultrasound technology to create keepsake 
photos, further supporting the theory that the ultrasound experience is a positive one for women 
with planned pregnancies.  Keighley, supra note 11, at 2401–02. 
 82.  Ellen R. Wiebe & Lisa Adams, Women’s Perceptions About Seeing the Ultrasound 
Picture Before an Abortion, 14 EUR. J. CONTRACEPTION AND REPROD. HEALTH CARE 97, 99–101 
(2009); see also A.A. Bamigboye et al., Should Women View the Ultrasound Image Before First-
Trimester Termination of Pregnancy?, 92 S. AFR. MED. J. 430, 431–32 (2002) (noting that in a 
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found that, of the eighty-seven percent of women seeking abortions who did 
not have ultrasounds (or had an ultrasound but chose not to view it), some 
believed that viewing the fetal image might have caused them to feel guilty 
and change their minds about having an abortion.
83
 
Regardless of whether abortion opponents’ optimism about ultrasound 
laws is warranted, the argument that mandatory ultrasounds will reduce 
abortion rates is a compelling tool in the pro-life arsenal.
84
  The 
development of prenatal ultrasound technology stands as a remarkable 
example of the cultural impact of medical discovery.  The prenatal 
ultrasound, which allows a viewer to observe a living fetus in the womb, 
has without a doubt facilitated public conversations about fetal personhood 
and thereby affected the debate about abortion as public policy.
85
  Richard 
Posner notes that before prenatal ultrasounds became available, pro-choice 
advocates “could tell vivid stories and . . . show photographs of women 
killed by botched illegal abortions, whereas the abortion ‘victim,’ the fetus, 
was hidden from view.”86  When the fetal image became visible through 
ultrasound technology, however, “the rhetorical advantage that proponents 
of abortion rights had enjoyed by virtue of the heuristic” disappeared.87  The 
now clearly visible fetus—complete with heartbeat, fingers, toes, and facial 
expressions—made pro-life advocates’ arguments about fetal personhood 
more concrete and more tactile.
88
 
                                                          
controlled trial where ultrasound screens for the control group faced the patient, and ultrasound 
screens for the experimental group were turned away from the patient, there was no difference in 
how many women ultimately chose to undergo pregnancy termination).  The Bamigboye study 
also found that, when asked after the fact, sixty-four percent of women planning to terminate their 
pregnancies said they would prefer to see the ultrasound image.  Id. at 431. 
 83.  O. Graham et al., Viewing Ultrasound Scan Images Prior to Termination of Pregnancy: 
Choice for Women or Conflict for Ultrasonographers?, 30 J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 484, 
486 (2010); see also Bamigboye et al., supra note 82, at 432 (reporting commentary from women 
who preferred not to view the ultrasounds as “ha[ving] to do with guilt and avoidance”). 
 84.  See TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 23 (“[C]onsidered as science, the theory of ultrasound 
bonding is highly dubious, but considered as a social and cultural phenomenon it is very real 
indeed.”).  
 85.  See, e.g., Mills, Images and Emotion, supra note 20, at 61–62 (discussing views linking 
fetal images and abortion debates); Petchesky, supra note 20, at 263–64 (explaining how fetal 
images are used by antichoice proponents to project fetal personhood and influence reproductive 
rights policy); Sanger, supra note 79, at 356–57 (discussing how fetal imagery “has been 
incorporated into the regulation of abortion in the United States”). 
 86.  Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 309, 
323 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  See Rita Beck Black, Seeing the Baby: The Impact of Ultrasound Technology, 1 J. 
GENETIC COUNSELING 45, 46 (1992) (“Seeing the baby move seems to further confirm its life and 
identity . . . .”); Joanne Boucher, The Politics of Abortion and the Commodification of the Fetus, 
73 STUD. IN POL. ECON. 69, 76 (2004) (“[T]he public fetal image visually summarizes in an 
appealing way the argument that ‘life begins at conception.’”); Mills, Images and Emotion, supra 
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It is this reified, culturally laden, and emotional visualization of the 
fetal body to which critics of the abortion ultrasound laws object most 
strenuously.  Numerous scholars of law, medical humanities, and feminist 
theory have challenged the state’s use of ultrasound imagery in this context 
on these grounds.
89
  The ultrasound image, according to many, represents a 
single vantage point from which to understand the relationship between 
mother and fetus,
90
 and improperly instructs women as to how they should 
make the abortion decision,
91
 “including to what extent they should include 
emotion in their deliberations.”92 
As might be expected, the new state laws regarding abortion 
ultrasounds have faced legal challenges.
93
  Lawsuits have met with mixed 
success.  The Fifth Circuit recently vacated a preliminary injunction against 
such a law, noting that the display of ultrasound images did not violate the 
First Amendment rights of physicians or the Fourteenth Amendment rights 
of patients because it satisfied Casey’s requirement that information 
                                                          
note 20, at 62 (describing the impact of ultrasound technology on fetal embodiment); Rustico et 
al., supra note 81, at 472 (commenting on “the growing importance of the power of the visual in 
Western culture” and noting that “the visual technology of ultrasound enables the fetus to be seen 
as a person”); Sanger, supra note 79, at 378 (arguing that ultrasound statutes are “meant to 
transform the embryo or fetus from an abstraction to a baby in the eyes of the potentially aborting 
mother”). 
 89.  See LISA M. MITCHELL, BABY’S FIRST PICTURE: ULTRASOUND AND THE POLITICS OF 
FETAL SUBJECTS 3–5 (2001) (critically discussing the normalization of ultrasound in various 
countries); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of 
Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 320 (2010) (criticizing ultrasound 
requirements for their reliance on the impact fetal images will have on women’s decisions to 
abort); James Rocha, Autonomous Abortions: The Inhibiting of Women’s Autonomy Through 
Legal Ultrasound Requirements, 22 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 35, 38 (2012) (objecting to 
mandatory ultrasound laws on the basis that they hinder the autonomous, individualized choices of 
women). 
 90.  See REBECCA KUKLA, MASS HYSTERIA: MEDICINE, CULTURE, AND MOTHERS’ BODIES 
113–14 (2005) (describing the ultrasound image as socially constructed to represent a particular 
perspective of maternal-fetal bonding); Petchesky, supra note 20, at 270 (concluding that “[t]he 
fetus as we know it is a fetish”); Sanger, supra note 79, at 383 (describing that mandatory 
ultrasound laws intended “to solidify the idea of a child so that the norms of maternal solicitude 
and protection begin to take hold”). 
 91.  See Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in 
Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1611 (2008) (describing ultrasound requirements as 
state responses to Casey’s observation that most women considering abortion would consider its 
impact on the fetus relevant to their decision). 
 92.  Rocha, supra note 89, at 38. 
 93.  In addition to the two cases discussed in this Article, an early lawsuit challenging a now-
defunct Louisiana abortion ultrasound law found the law unconstitutional on the grounds that the 
ultrasound procedure impedes women’s access to abortions by increasing costs and lessening the 
availability of abortion.  Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 660 (E.D. La. 1984).  A more 
recent decision by the Oklahoma Supreme Court likewise found a pre-abortion ultrasound law 
unconstitutional under Casey, but did not provide a substantive discussion of its decision.  Nova 
Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012). 
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provided as part of the abortion informed consent process be truthful and 
not misleading.
94
  The Middle District of North Carolina in Stuart, in 
contrast, applied strict scrutiny to the First Amendment claim and granted a 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of an ultrasound law; it 
concluded that the state’s interests in protecting women from emotional 
distress, preventing coercion, and promoting life were not compelling 
enough to justify requiring physicians to communicate messages with 
which they disagree.
95
 
III.  OBJECTIONS TO EMOTIONAL PERSUASION 
The bulk of the constitutional arguments against the health campaigns 
described above focus on the wrongs suffered by speakers who are 
compelled to communicate messages with which they disagree.  The 
primary objections, however, voiced by the general public, by media, and 
by scholars of law and ethics rarely track the First Amendment arguments 
against compelled speech.  Rather, as highlighted in Part II, the core of the 
public opposition to tobacco labeling and abortion ultrasound laws focuses 
on the impropriety of the state’s use of emotional imagery for persuasive 
purposes—that is, the format of the government’s message and the 
emotions evoked in its audience, rather than its compulsion of third parties 
to convey its message.  This Part more fully describes the argument against 
emotional persuasion, and highlights its roots in economic theory, social 
psychology, political philosophy, applied ethics, and even some areas of 
law. 
Critics of the tobacco labeling and abortion ultrasound campaigns 
recognize that the government must communicate with citizens in order to 
achieve its policy goals.  They believe, however, that while the government 
has a right to express its perspective in public debate, it ought not 
communicate this perspective in a manner that calls more upon citizens’ 
emotional instincts than their analytical skills.  One legal scholar has 
referred to “forcing unwanted imagery” on citizens as “a kind of violence 
                                                          
 94.  Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Svcs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580–84 (5th Cir. 
2012) (holding that a mandatory ultrasound law’s provisions were “within the State’s power to 
regulate” and that “[n]o extreme burden is placed on the physician, nor is the woman harmed if 
she receives the printed matter”).  
 95.  Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (holding that the mandatory 
ultrasound law’s provisions were “likely to harm the psychological health of the very group the 
state purports to protect”; that defendants failed to articulate how the provisions would reduce the 
likelihood of coerced abortions; and that precedent has not suggested that the state interest in 
potential life is “compelling” during the entire term of a woman’s pregnancy), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 
(4th Cir. 2013). 
 476 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:458 
 
[that results in] emotional trauma.”96  Others have compared abortion 
ultrasound laws to requiring that parties to a divorce first “participate in 
individualized sessions where their own children could express face to face 
how much they want Mommy and Daddy to stay married”;97 or asking 
potential organ donors “to look at photographs of the next three people on 
the donor list.”98 
While the man on the street may articulate his opinion
99
 about graphic 
tobacco and ultrasound images in terms as simple as “intrusive . . . and . . . 
cruel,”100 “disgusting,”101 “gross,”102 and “shocking,”103 the ethical 
argument against the state’s use of emotional persuasion has deep roots in a 
variety of disciplines. 
The fundamental principle grounding the objection to emotional 
persuasion is the belief that persuasion is and ought to be a rational 
process.
104
  The goal of persuasion is not simply to change a listener’s 
opinion, but rather to change the listener’s opinion by appealing to analytic 
skills, with the recognition that the listener may not ultimately choose to 
adopt the persuader’s stance.  Some scholars have described this distinction 
as one between manipulation and persuasion.
105
  Others categorize these 
                                                          
 96.  Sherry F. Colb, Some Reflections on the Texas Pre-Abortion Ultrasound Law, a Year 
After Its Passage, JUSTIA.COM (June 6, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/06/some-
reflections-on-the-texas-pre-abortion-ultrasound-law-a-year-after-its-passage-2. 
 97.  Sanger, supra note 79, at 390. 
 98.  Id. at 393; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 937 n.7 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that appendicitis patients are not required to look at their 
appendix before consenting to its removal); Waldman, supra note 53 (“Imagine that you wanted to 
lose weight, but you love ice cream.  What if every time you reached for that carton of Ben & 
Jerry’s, you had to look at a photo of a morbidly obese man dying from a heart attack?  Would 
that make you less likely to indulge?”). 
 99.  Few people, scholars included, are able to clearly articulate their objections to emotional 
persuasion.  See Franklyn S. Haiman, Democratic Ethics and the Hidden Persuaders, 44 Q. J. 
SPEECH 385, 386 (1958) (“The average American appears to feel considerable ambivalence in 
regard to hidden persuasion.  He vaguely senses there may be something wrong about it, but when 
asked to say why, is usually unable to present cogent arguments.”); Rossi & Yudell, supra note 
20, at 192 (noting that public health communications designed to influence have been viewed as 
problematic, but “the reasons for this are often incompletely explained or explored”). 
 100.  Kevin Sack, In Ultrasound, Abortion Fight Has New Front, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, 
at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101.  Chan, supra note 51. 
 102.  Glynn, supra note 52. 
 103.  Waldman, supra note 53. 
 104.  See Arthur N. Kruger, The Ethics of Persuasion: A Re-Examination, 16 THE SPEECH 
TEACHER 295, 296 (1967) (arguing that the “emotional” mode of proof “belittles rational 
processes [and] shows little faith in man’s ability to govern himself” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 105.  See, e.g., BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION: A DEFENSE OF RHETORIC AND 
JUDGMENT 7 (2006) (distinguishing persuasion from manipulation, coercion, and brainwashing); 
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two approaches as “strategic persuasion” and “deliberative persuasion.”106  
For example, Nathaniel Klemp defines deliberative persuasion as the 
sincere use of rhetoric and merit-based arguments “to induce agreement 
with an orientation toward mutual understanding,” and strategic persuasion 
as the inducement of agreement where the “intent to win trumps the intent 
to achieve mutual understanding.”107  Whether described as manipulation or 
persuasion, attempts to change a listener’s opinion by appealing to 
something other than the listener’s capacity for reasoned analysis have long 
been viewed as normatively inferior to rational persuasion.
108
 
It should be emphasized that it is both impossible and undesirable to 
categorize persuasive appeals as “strictly rational” or “strictly 
emotional.”109  The exercise of reason falls on a spectrum.110  At one end of 
the spectrum, an appeal can be made on primarily rational grounds—
presenting truthful facts on both sides of the argument, with no 
inaccuracies, omissions, or biases.  At the other end of the spectrum, we see 
appeals that influence choices on grounds unrelated to reasoned argument, 
such as those that aspire to change a listener’s emotional state and 
decisions.  Most persuasive appeals fall somewhere in between.  That said, 
the ethical arguments against arational or emotional persuasion do not 
depend on there being a clear way to empirically assess whether any given 
persuasive appeal is “more rational” or “more emotional.”111 
                                                          
Sarah Buss, Valuing Autonomy and Respecting Persons: Manipulation, Seduction, and the Basis 
of Moral Constraints, 115 ETHICS 195, 210 (2005) (explaining the view that manipulation is 
morally distinct from rational persuasion); Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Autonomy and Benevolent Lies, 18 
J. VALUE INQUIRY 251, 258 (1984) (explaining how beliefs about autonomy compete with beliefs 
about benevolent lies); Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 20, at 5 (asserting that 
“[m]anipulation falls somewhere in between coercion . . . [and] rational persuasion”). 
 106.  See Nathaniel Klemp, When Rhetoric Turns Manipulative: Disentangling Persuasion and 
Manipulation, in MANIPULATING DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRATIC THEORY, POLITICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, AND MASS MEDIA 59, 70 (Wayne Le Cheminant & John M. Parrish, eds., 2011) 
[hereinafter MANIPULATING DEMOCRACY] (providing contrasting definitions of strategic and 
deliberative persuasion). 
 107.  Id. at 70-71; see also James Fishkin, Manipulation and Democratic Theory, in 
MANIPULATING DEMOCRACY, supra note 106, at 31, 34 (arguing that persuasion or deliberation, 
unlike manipulation, contemplates “a dialogue or debate in which accurate information is 
available and in which it is expected that the other side will have its say”). 
 108.  See Buss, supra note 105, at 208–10 (describing views on the morally problematic nature 
of manipulation). 
 109.  See Klemp, supra note 106, at 67–68 (problematizing the “simple dichotomy between 
emotion and reason”). 
 110.  See Fishkin, supra note 107, at 34 (describing a continuum running from rational 
deliberation to manipulation). 
 111.  See Buss, supra note 105, at 208–10 (discussing arguments against emotional persuasion 
that rest on ethical objections). 
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Examples of the perceived primacy of rational over emotional 
decisionmaking are abundant.  Traditional economic theory, for example, 
assumes rational behavior on the part of actors in the marketplace (though 
economists’ definitions of rationality may differ from the layperson’s 
definitions).
112
  This fundamental premise, however, has been widely 
criticized in recent years, most notably by behavioral economists who offer 
evidence that human decisionmaking rarely follows purely rational 
pathways and that, as a result, we often make economically inefficient 
choices.
113
  That said, the practical application of the insights gleaned from 
behavioral economics seems to be aimed primarily at circumventing the 
nonrational aspects of human decisionmaking, such as inherent biases, the 
use of heuristics, and other psychological faults in an effort to optimize 
behavior.
114
  Thus, even economic theories that recognize the failings of 
human rationality strive to highlight these failings in an effort to encourage 
decisionmakers to reach the outcomes that a rational actor, unhindered by 
cognitive biases, would reach.
115
 
The ideal of the rational actor as mediator of decisions is further 
supported by empirical research in social psychology.  Daniel Kahneman, 
for example, describes human decisionmaking as a combination of two 
systems.
116
  Our primary (or peripheral) system makes choices quickly and 
easily, often relying on heuristics and past experience, to facilitate our day-
                                                          
 112.  See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 153 (1976) 
(defining rational behavior as “consistent maximization of a well-ordered function, such as a 
utility or profit function”). 
 113.  See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE 
OUR DECISIONS 1– 21 (HarperCollins rev. ed. 2009) (explaining how ordinary decisions are more 
relative than objectively rational); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 17–39 (2009) (describing 
common cognitive errors that lead to irrational choices).  
 114.  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 74 (pointing to how information about 
when we are least likely to make good decisions can be used to improve our decisionmaking 
capacities). 
 115.  Interestingly, however, advocates of the “nudge” model of behavioral economics 
frequently rely on the very same heuristics and cognitive biases they criticize in order to change 
peoples’ behavior.  In the example introduced by Thaler and Sunstein in NUDGE, they consider a 
cafeteria manager who, in an effort to encourage healthy eating, changes the design of the 
cafeteria buffet to place healthier options at the head of the line (taking advantage of a common 
cognitive bias).  Id. at 1–2. 
 116.  See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011) (“System 1 operates 
automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and sense of voluntary control. . . . System 2 
allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex 
computations.  The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of 
agency, choice, and concentration.”). 
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to-day decisionmaking.
117
  Our secondary (or central) system, instead, relies 
more on reasoned analysis and expends far greater energy and effort in 
making choices.
118
  While some scholars in other disciplines have described 
emotional or primary decisionmaking as “short-circuiting” reason and 
leading to poor choices,
119
 Kahneman and his colleagues are explicit in 
saying that neither process is privileged or better.
120
  Primary decisions, for 
example, are an extremely efficient and highly accurate means of operating 
in the day-to-day world—for example, we do not need to conduct a 
secondary central analysis of which sock to put on first when we get 
dressed in the morning.  Even Kahneman, however, cautions that peripheral 
reasoning may occasionally lead us astray, and that central reasoning should 
be used as a check on peripheral reasoning if people want to make optimal 
decisions.
121
 
Concerns about the use of emotional persuasion are even stronger 
beyond the realm of the empirical disciplines.  In philosophy, rhetoric, and 
political theory, many commentators advise caution in the use of emotion to 
persuade, especially by government actors. 
In philosophy, nonconsequentialist moral theories emphasize the 
importance of autonomy in personal decisionmaking.  Autonomy has been 
defined by one author as “a capacity and disposition to make choices in a 
rational manner,” that is, without being subject to obstacles that interfere 
with rational choice.
122
  This conception of autonomy has its roots in 
                                                          
 117.  Psychology research about the impact of images on decisionmaking suggests that images 
and emotional prompts trigger the primary system, bypassing the reasoned analysis of the 
secondary system.  See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 691–93 (2012) (noting that messages conveyed in visual 
terms will trigger emotional responses more quickly than textual or verbal messages).   
 118.  KAHNEMAN, supra note 116, at 21. 
 119.  See Kruger, supra note 104, at 300 (“[W]hen man experiences strong feelings, he tends to 
short-circuit his thinking process, to jump to conclusions, to act hastily, to yield to atavistic 
impulses.”); Posner, supra note 86, at 310–11 (“[E]motion short-circuits reason conceived of as a 
conscious, articulate process of deliberation, calculation, analysis, or reflection.”). 
 120.  KAHNEMAN, supra note 116, at 408–18; see also Posner, supra note 86, at 310–11 
(“Emotion is an efficient method of cognition in some cases but an inefficient one in others. . . . 
[E]motion focuses attention, crystallizes evaluation, and prompts action in circumstances in which 
reflection would be interminable, unfocused, and indecisive.  But in situations in which making an 
intelligent decision requires careful, sequential analysis or reflection, emotion may, by supplanting 
that process, generate an inferior decision.”). 
 121.  KAHNEMAN, supra note 116, at 408–18. 
 122.  Hill, supra note 105, at 256; see also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, 
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 58–59 (6th ed. 2009) (defining autonomy as “at a minimum, 
self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from limitations such as an 
inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice”). 
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Immanuel Kant’s writings in The Metaphysics of Morals.123  Kant identifies 
the principle of autonomy, or self-governance, as “the sole principle of 
ethics.”124  According to Kant, only rational beings have autonomy of will, 
and it is by virtue of our rationality and autonomy that we can access and 
act upon moral truths.
125
  The exercise of what Kant calls practical reason 
must be done without reference to externalities or “alien influences” that 
cloud one’s judgment.126  Such alien influences, according to Kant, include 
“incitements from desires and impulses (and therefore from the whole 
sensible worlds of nature),”127 as well as influences from third parties.128  In 
his writing, he refers to passion,
129
 envy,
130
 pain,
131
 and concerns about 
reputation,
132
 among others, as influences that weaken autonomy and moral 
resolve.
133
  Kant’s ideas are widely reflected in contemporary literature on 
applied ethics
134—particularly medical ethics135 and communication 
                                                          
 123.  See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE 
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J. Paton trans., Hutchinson Univ. Library 1966) (1948) [hereinafter 
KANT, MORAL LAW]. 
 124.  Id. at 102. 
 125.  Id. at 101. 
 126.  Id. at 109. 
 127.  Id. at 118. 
 128.  In his essay, What Is Enlightenment?, Kant described enlightenment as “the human 
being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority” and called on his readers to have the courage 
to use their own understanding “without direction from another.”  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 40 (2010) (“A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are 
the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is 
said to have a character.  One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no 
more than a steam-engine has a character.”). 
 129.  IMMANUEL KANT, 2 ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL, AND VARIOUS 
PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 16 (Hoffman 1798) [hereinafter KANT, ESSAYS AND TREATISES]. 
 130.  IMMANUEL KANT, 2 THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, DIVIDED INTO METAPHYSICAL 
ELEMENTS OF LAW AND OF ETHICS 47 (Hoffman 1799). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  KANT, MORAL LAW, supra note 123, at 89. 
 133.  KANT, ESSAYS AND TREATISES, supra note 129, at 124.  
 134.  See, e.g., Eric M. Cave, What’s Wrong with Motive Manipulation?, 10 ETHICAL THEORY 
& MORAL PRACTICE 129, 136 (2007) (“[Mo]tive manipulation might be wrong because it violates 
the injunction to act autonomously.  This injunction is associated most closely with Kant’s moral 
philosophy.  On Kant’s view, to act autonomously is to act rationally, to act from an awareness of 
the requirements of reason alone.”). 
 135.  See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 122, at 100 (focusing on the importance 
of autonomy in the context of healthcare decisions); Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 
20, at 4 (noting that “manipulation always involves some infringement on a person’s autonomy”); 
Rossi & Yudell, supra note 20, at 193 (arguing that “persuasion infringes upon autonomy, [] it 
leads to inadvertent harm, and [] it is objectionable on principle because persuasive messages are 
rationally indefensible”). 
 2014] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HEALTH CAMPAIGNS 481 
 
ethics.
136
  While it is clear that not all third-party appeals to emotion are 
violations of autonomy, the line between autonomy-defeating emotional 
appeals and permissible emotional appeals is, as many scholars recognize, 
an extremely difficult one to draw.
137
 
The discipline of rhetoric, or the art of effective communication, 
likewise shares concerns about the use of emotion to persuade.  Traditional 
theories of rhetoric describe the concept as composed of three primary 
elements: logos (logic, or the truth of the ideas presented), pathos (appeals 
to emotion, passion, or prejudice), and ethos (the listeners’ impression of 
the credibility or character of the advocate).
138
  Aristotle described the value 
of pathos as follows: Persuasion is effected “through the medium of the 
hearers, when they shall have been brought to a state of excitement under 
the influence of the speech; for we do not, when influenced by pain or joy, 
or partiality or dislike, award our decisions in the same way.”139  This 
principle—that influencing a listener’s emotions is necessary to affect her 
judgment—is still widely recognized today.140  Most rhetoricians view this 
technique as a positive one,
141
 noting that emotional appeals are uniquely 
                                                          
 136.  See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991) (“Violating the persuasion principle is wrong for some of the 
reasons that lies [that are told for the purpose of influencing behavior] are wrong: both involve a 
denial of autonomy in the sense that they interfere with a person’s control over her own reasoning 
processes.  This justification of the persuasion principle can be characterized as Kantian.”). 
 137.  See, e.g., Rossi & Yudell, supra note 20, at 193 (noting that while “[a] number of ethical 
critiques of health communication have asserted that attempts to influence message recipients by 
definition infringe upon their autonomy[,] . . . these claims are often general, and when they are 
evaluated in more detail against specific criteria for autonomous choice, doubt emerges that 
persuasion intrinsically infringes upon autonomy”). 
 138.  BRIAN VICKERS, IN DEFENCE OF RHETORIC 19–21 (1988) (describing “the three kinds or 
modes of persuasion”).   
 139.  ARISTOTLE, TREATISE ON RHETORIC 12 (Theodore Buckley trans., Prometheus 1995) 
(1851). 
 140.  See Hugh Blair, Lectures of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Lecture XXXII, in THE 
RHETORICAL TRADITION: READINGS FROM CLASSICAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 824–25 (Patricia 
Bizzell & Bruce Herzberg eds., 1990) (describing the persuasive power of pathos and ethos); 
George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, in THE RHETORICAL TRADITION: READINGS FROM 
CLASSICAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 903–04 (Patricia Bizzell & Bruce Herzberg eds., 1990) 
(“[T]he most complex of all, which is calculated to influence the will, and persuade to a certain 
conduct, is in reality an artful mixture of that which proposes to convince the judgment, and that 
which interests the passions, its distinguishing excellency results from these two, the 
argumentative and the pathetic incorporated together.”); RICHARD WEAVER, THE ETHICS OF 
RHETORIC 9 (1953) (“Rhetorical language on the other hand, for whatever purpose used, excites 
interest and with it either pleasure or alarm.”). 
 141.  See, e.g., EDWARD P.J. CORBETT, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 86 
(3d ed. 1990) (“There is nothing necessarily reprehensible about being moved to action through 
our emotions; in fact, it is perfectly normal . . . [because] many of our actions are prompted by the 
stimulus of our emotions.”); MARCUS FABIUS QUINTILIANUS, Book XII, in 2 QUINTILIAN’S 
INSTITUTES OF ELOQUENCE: OR, THE ART OF SPEAKING IN PUBLIC, IN EVERY CHARACTER AND 
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capable of “excit[ing] public opinion” and drawing people into debate in 
ways that neutral and factual appeals cannot.
142
  In particular, many 
rhetoricians focus on the use of vivid images as emotionally triggering.
143
  
Even the most prominent supporters of the use of pathos, however, warn 
that this technique can be problematic.  As one scholar notes, Aristotle 
emphasized the importance of nonrational methods of persuasion, but 
cautioned that “perhaps the greatest and most dangerous disadvantage of 
democracy is that such citizens are alternately agitated, pandered to, 
flattered, and fooled by demagogues who play to their hopes, their 
prejudices, and—most especially—their fears.”144  Many commentators 
note that emotional appeals may be used in either appropriate or 
inappropriate ways;
145
 however, the distinction between the two is often 
unclear. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, political theory also raises 
concerns about emotional persuasion by government agents.  Even if 
persuading people through emotionally laden imagery is permissible, as 
some might argue, the use of such techniques by those in positions of power 
raises independent ethical concerns.  Theories of deliberative democracy in 
political science literature, for example, reinforce the emphasis on reasoned 
persuasion in the context of government communication.  Jürgen Habermas, 
for example, believes that law’s legitimacy depends on the quality of public 
deliberation and argues that state manipulation violates the principles of 
                                                          
CAPACITY 440 (W. Guthrie ed., 1805) [hereinafter QUINTILIAN ] (“[A]s [the orator’s] profession 
leads him to give delight and emotion, and to mould the mind of the hearer into various affections, 
he is justified in taking advantage of those assistancies, which even nature bids him employ.”). 
 142.  See Book III, in 1 QUINTILIAN, supra note 141, at 167–68 (to persuade the people, “it is 
generally necessary to give a circumstantial detail of the affair, so as to move their passions, 
which is the great point . . .  In order to do this, we are frequently to rouse, and to calm, their 
resentments; we are to work upon their fears, their wishes, their hatred, and to touch every spring 
of their passions.”); see also WEAVER, supra note 140, at 9 (“People listen instinctively to the man 
whose speech betrays inclination.  It does not matter what the inclination is toward, but we may 
say that the greater the degree of inclination, the greater the curiosity or response.”). 
 143.  See JOHN H. MACKIN, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR MODERN DISCOURSE 195 (1969) 
(citing “the use of living pictures of events” as a way to make emotional appeals more effective); 
John Bender & David E. Wellbery, Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of Rhetoric, in THE 
ENDS OF RHETORIC: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE 3, 32 (John Bender & David E. Wellbery eds., 
1990) (noting that “[i]mages and slogans [have] replace[d] the ideas and expository discourse by 
which exchange in the public sphere [is] defined”); VICKERS, supra note 138, at 79 (citing 
Shakespeare to illustrate the impact of emotional appeal in speech). 
 144.  Terence Ball, Manipulation: As Old as Democracy Itself (and Sometimes Dangerous), in 
MANIPULATING DEMOCRACY, supra note 106, at 41, 54. 
 145.  See, e.g., CORBETT, supra note 141, at 87 (noting that “some people play on other 
people’s emotions for unscrupulous purposes,” and that this “may constitute a caution about the 
use of emotional appeal”). 
 2014] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HEALTH CAMPAIGNS 483 
 
democratic discourse.
146
  Likewise, Kant refers to such tactics as “erod[ing] 
the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty.”147  Some contemporary 
commentators have focused specifically on the violation of norms of public 
discourse that occur when “grotesque imagery” is introduced into 
deliberations.
148
  Much of the opposition to government emotional 
persuasion arises from the idea that an actor in a position of power, when 
using emotion to persuade, is engaging in unfair terms of social 
exchange.
149
  There is, according to some, an important distinction 
“between manipulative practices of persuasion, which we tolerate for 
selling consumer products, and the sort of collective public will formation 
that makes democracy meaningful.”150  Those in positions of power, it is 
argued, ought not encourage arational decisionmaking.
151
 
The arguments against emotional persuasion that arise from ethics, 
rhetoric, and political philosophy are not, however, merely lip service to an 
impractical ideal.  Indeed, in at least one area of law, the argument against 
the government’s use of emotional persuasion takes a very concrete form.  
Prosecutors in criminal trials frequently introduce graphic and emotionally 
stirring evidence to plead their case before a jury.
152
  Evidence law, 
however, which prohibits the use of prejudicial evidence, poses limits on 
                                                          
 146.  Ball, supra note 144, at 41. 
 147.  See Klemp, supra note 106, at 76–77 (noting that political manipulation “erodes the 
epistemic quality of political debate” and “threatens the ideal of democracy as rule of the 
people”). 
 148.  Halfmann & Young, supra note 64. 
 149.  See, e.g., Patricia Greenspan, The Problem with Manipulation, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 155, 160 
(2003) (“Manipulation is unfair to the extent that it involves taking more than one’s fair share of 
power over the other party’s choice situation—whether by deception or some other means.”); 
Klemp, supra note 106, at 81 (“As power relationships grow more asymmetrical, however, the 
immorality of manipulation increases,” as in politics.). 
 150.  Fishkin, supra note 107, at 39. 
 151.  See Kruger, supra note 104, at 300 (“A truly ethical speaker respects the intelligence of 
his listeners and tries to get them to think about what he is saying, however difficult thinking 
might be for some.  Only in this way does he show any respect for democratic values, which 
presume that people can think for themselves and govern themselves intelligently.”).  Critics may 
caution that governments are not the only entities with sufficient power to make emotional 
persuasion unethical.  Some tobacco companies, for example, have a net worth in excess of that of 
some countries, and thus can assert significant power over consumer preferences.  If this is the 
case, critics might argue, perhaps the argument from deliberative democracy ought to be extended 
to protect against emotional persuasion by powerful non-governmental entities.  I recognize this as 
a possibility, and offer the argument from a deliberative democracy perspective merely in the 
context of state speech, without comment as to other forms of speech.  I take no stance on whether 
and to what extent the ethics of public communications differ from the ethics of private 
communications—indeed, this would require a much more thorough interrogation of the values 
implicated in corporate communication. 
 152.  See Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 86, AT 1, 1–2 
(outlining ways emotion enters the courtroom). 
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the use of emotionally gripping evidence such as gruesome photographs 
and videos:  Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 403 permits a court to 
exclude even unquestionably relevant evidence where the danger of “unfair 
prejudice” substantially outweighs the evidence’s probative value.153  The 
Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 403 define unfair prejudice as “an 
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, 
though not necessarily, an emotional one.”154  Many commentators, rightly 
or wrongly, equate FRE 403, which focuses on prejudice, with emotion.
155
  
In short, the basis of this rule is the exact sort of argument highlighted in 
the ethical discussion above—that it is wrong to take advantage of emotion 
to persuade.
156
  In addition to these ethical concerns, pragmatic concerns 
ground FRE 403—namely, the idea that “jurors might incorrectly decide a 
case if they vote with their hearts rather than their heads.”157  Both 
practicing attorneys and laypeople tend to think of jurors’ tendency toward 
feelings such as compassion, mercy, anger, and vengeance as 
                                                          
 153.  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 154.  FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s notes. 
 155.  See Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 
220, 238 (1976) (“To be prejudicial, evidence must appeal to irrationality or emotion.”); Victor J. 
Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial 
Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 503 (1982) (“Current case law considers ‘emotion’ the hallmark 
of unfair prejudice.”); Thomas F. Green, Jr., Relevancy and Its Limits, 1969 L. & SOC. ORD. 533, 
543–44 (1969) (describing emotional arousal as the primary evil to be prevented by the prejudice 
rule). 
 156.  See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 
30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 120 (2006) (“A core presumption underlying modern legality is that 
reason and emotion are different beasts entirely: they belong to separate spheres of human 
existence; the sphere of law admits only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep 
emotion from creeping in where it does not belong.”); Richard L. Wiener et al., Emotion and the 
Law: A Framework for Inquiry, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 232 (2006) (“[M]ost studies of legal 
decision making treat emotion (and motivation) as unwanted intruders in the objective world of 
weighing inputs and throughputs to reach one of a very few permissible outputs.”); see also 
Bandes, supra note 152, at 2 (“In the conventional story, emotion has a certain, narrowly defined 
place in law. . . . [I]t is portrayed as crucially important to narrowly delineate [emotion’s] . . . 
proper roles, so that emotion doesn’t encroach on the true preserve of law: which is reason.”); id. 
at 7 (“[E]motion, by its very nature, threatens much of what law hopes to be.  To the extent legal 
systems thrive on categorical rules, emotion in all its messy individuality makes such categories 
harder to maintain.”).  But see Posner, supra note 86, at 310 (describing the “dichotomizing [of] 
reason and emotion” as “misleading”). 
 157.  J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-Choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 64 
IND. L.J. 831, 841 (1989); see also Bandes, supra note 152, at 7 (“[E]motions cause prejudice 
because they mislead jurors into making hasty decisions based on passion instead of slowly 
evaluating all the evidence.”). 
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“illegitimate”158 or “untrustworth[y],”159 potentially leading to inferential 
error,
160
 errors in logic,
161
 and inaccuracy.
162
 
There are, of course, a number of powerful counterarguments to the 
argument against emotional persuasion.  First, the argument, most closely 
associated with David Hume, that the preference for rational reasoning is 
invalid because it does not accurately represent how people actually make 
decisions—namely, that our decisions are ultimately driven by passion 
rather than reason.
163
  Indeed, this argument echoes the findings of some 
researchers in social psychology, like Kahneman.
164
 
Second, utilitarians may argue that triggering arational instincts like 
emotion is necessary to get people to engage in public debate.  Some 
scholars of political philosophy, for example, believe that the government 
would be remiss if it did not rely on all the tools at its disposal, even 
emotional cues, to persuade the public of the merits of greater policy 
goals.
165
  Aristotle argued that, in order to succeed in politics, one must 
“magnify or minimize the leading facts, excite the required state of emotion 
in your hearers, and refresh their memories[;]”166 these principles are often 
reflected in the theory of rhetoric.
167
 This utilitarian claim, however, while 
compelling to a consequentialist, does not adequately address the 
                                                          
 158.  Bandes, supra note 152, at 2. 
 159.  Tushnet, supra note 117, at 697. 
 160.  See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 59, 72 (1984) (“[F]ew other rules [than Rule 403] are directly concerned with 
evidence that, while accurately reflecting a fact or event, may still lead the jury away from the 
truth because the evidence induces the jury to draw illogical or otherwise improper inferences 
from that fact or event.”); see also Gold, supra note 155, at 498–99 (“[E]vidence may be 
considered unfairly prejudicial when it has a tendency to cause the trier of fact to commit an 
inferential error.”).   
 161.  See Gold, supra note 160, at 76 (“Evidence presents a Rule 403 problem precisely 
because of the danger the jury will not use the evidence in a perfectly logical way.”). 
 162.  See id. at 65–66 (“Emotion is therefore dangerous since it may lead to inaccuracy.”). 
 163.  See David Hume, Book II, Part III. Of the Will and Direct Passions, in 2 THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DAVID HUME 167 (1826) (“I shall endeavour to prove first, that 
reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never 
oppose passion in the direction of the will.”). 
 164.  See supra text accompanying notes 116–121. 
 165.  For an example of this type of reasoning, consider the FDA’s comment in R.J. Reynolds 
that “their previous efforts to combat the tobacco companies’ advertising campaigns have been 
like bringing a butter knife to a gun fight.”  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 
1221 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 166.  Klemp, supra note 106, at 59. 
 167.  See generally Ball, supra note 144, at 43, 45, 50–52 (noting that “democracy and 
manipulation have been bedfellows since the origin of democracy” and providing examples 
thereof, such as Ancient Athenian theater, which incorporated criticisms of democracy, and 
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, which transposed values espoused in the Declaration of 
Independence into the Constitution). 
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deontologists’ concerns about arational persuasion detracting from 
autonomous decisionmaking. 
These objections are certainly worth exploring further.  It would 
indeed be naïve to think the government could succeed in achieving its 
policy goals by relying on facts and figures alone, which are unlikely to 
draw people into deliberative debate.
168
  For example, it may well be the 
case that utilitarian arguments in favor of emotional persuasion are strong 
enough to outweigh the ethical challenges, at least in some contexts (though 
identifying those contexts may be challenging).  Indeed, “[i]n practice, 
states take into account a variety of consequentialist concerns when making 
policy decisions, and often prioritize these concerns over considerations 
raised by theorists of deontology and virtue ethics.”169 
This Article does not propose that states abandon concerns about the 
practical outcomes of their policy decisions—outcomes do matter, 
especially on issues of national importance.  Rather, it emphasizes, as I 
argue in another article on this topic, that “when states rely on persuasive 
messaging to achieve favorable policy goals without considering the 
methods by which they seek to persuade, important ethical considerations 
are lost.”170 
Moreover, as a general matter, these legitimate consequentialist 
defenses of emotional persuasion by the state do not detract from the fact 
that objections to emotional persuasion have a long and storied history 
within a wide variety of disparate disciplines, and therefore may reasonably 
be presumed to have some legitimate grounding.  The fact that these 
objections are being raised still, even by members of the public with no 
training in political philosophy or applied ethics, further supports the 
importance of research into whether doctrines of American constitutional 
law reflect any recognition of these concerns. 
IV.  EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES NEGLECT CONCERNS ABOUT 
THE EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF IMAGERY 
The constitutional challenges to the tobacco and ultrasound laws take a 
variety of approaches.  First Amendment challenges argue that the laws 
compel speakers to communicate government messages with which they 
                                                          
 168.  See GARSTEN, supra note 105, at 36 (“Rhetorical appeals to people’s partial and 
passionate points of view can often be a good means of drawing out their capacity for judgment 
and so drawing them into deliberation”); Haiman, supra note 99, at 388 (noting that emotional 
persuasion may “stimulate [a person’s] thinking by bringing him into vivid contact with a problem 
he has not thought about before”). 
 169.  Sawicki, supra note 18, at 47. 
 170.  Id. 
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may not agree; tobacco manufacturers rely on the doctrine of compelled 
commercial speech to make this claim.  Medical providers, moreover, have 
raised additional arguments about the rights of professionals to be free from 
state intrusion into professional speech, a category of speech that the 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed with any clarity.  Additional 
arguments include tobacco manufacturers’ claims under the Fifth 
Amendment that the mandated tobacco warnings constitute an unlawful 
taking;
171
 and arguments that pre-abortion ultrasounds violate women’s 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to reproductive privacy. 
While these constitutional arguments reflect a variety of ethical 
principles—including the freedom to speak one’s own mind freely; the 
freedom to remain silent when asked to communicate state-sponsored 
messages; the autonomy of medical providers to define their scope of 
practice and make patient-specific determinations about medical care; 
professionals’ fiduciary obligations toward their patients; and the ethical 
principles of informed consent—one is conspicuously absent.  The 
constitutional doctrines available to challengers of the tobacco and 
ultrasound laws, at least as they have been interpreted to date, do not 
obviously reflect the concerns described in Part III about the means by 
which the government communicates its policy messages. 
This Part focuses on the First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges 
that form the core of the pending lawsuits.  It explains how the few federal 
courts that have reached substantive decisions on the tobacco and 
ultrasound challenges have analyzed the issues, including the extent to 
which they have considered litigants’ arguments about emotional 
persuasion.  Only one precedential decision has explicitly recognized 
concerns about the emotional impact of the state-mandated imagery, though 
the issue has been highlighted by two dissenting judges.  The remaining 
courts that have resolved the tobacco and ultrasound challenges have either 
dismissed or failed to address litigants’ arguments about emotional 
persuasion.  Thus, existing precedent in these contexts provides limited 
                                                          
 171.  See, e.g., Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 540 (W.D. 
Ky. 2010) (finding lack of jurisdiction on the takings claim), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Disc. 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F. 3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).  Takings arguments 
have also been particularly prominent in international litigation relating to tobacco labeling laws, 
in part because other nations do not offer speech protections as strong as those in the United 
States.  See, e.g., JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (2012) 291 ALR 669, 673 (Austl.)  (addressing 
plaintiffs’ arguments that tobacco labeling laws constitute unlawful acquisition of property within 
the meaning of the Australian Constitution); Abal Hermanos, S.A. v. Uruguay, (2010) Sentencia 
No. 1713 (Suprema Corte de Justicia) [Supreme Court of Uruguay], available at 
http://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/litigation/decisions/uy-20101117-abal-hermanos,-s.a.-v.-
uruguay (addressing plaintiffs’ arguments that tobacco labeling laws interfered with property 
rights by expropriating use of trademarks without fair compensation). 
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support for the argument, which this Article defends in Part V, that the 
emotional impact of persuasive compelled imagery is relevant to the 
constitutional analysis. 
A.  First Amendment Challenges 
The primary constitutional challenge raised against the tobacco and 
ultrasound laws is a First Amendment compelled speech challenge.  
Petitioners in these cases argue that the government’s mandate that tobacco 
manufacturers and physicians communicate messages with which they 
disagree violates the First Amendment’s prohibition on compelled speech. 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits laws 
abridging the freedom of speech.
172
  First Amendment doctrine, which is 
aimed at government interference with private speech, does not, however, 
impose direct restrictions on the government as a speaker.
173
  Therefore, 
from a constitutional perspective, the government generally has wide 
latitude to disseminate information that it deems to be of public benefit.
174
 
One limitation on government communication—highlighted in the 
tobacco and ultrasound lawsuits—is that the government faces significant 
restrictions when it seeks to compel a third party to communicate a message 
on its behalf.
175
  Typically in such cases, strict scrutiny applies: in order for 
an intervention to satisfy constitutional muster, the government must 
demonstrate that its speech mandate is narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling state interest.
176
  The compelling state interest test, as one might 
imagine, cannot be satisfied where the mandated speech is ideological in 
                                                          
 172.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 173.  See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562, 566–67 (2005) (concluding 
that the Free Speech Clause does not regulate government speech); Blocher, supra note 1, at 706–
08 (noting that “government speech” is a defense to First Amendment claims by individuals).  
Indirect restrictions on government speech are typically derived from citizens’ First Amendment 
rights, and include the Establishment Clause, the opening of public forums, and the captive 
audience doctrine; see also Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–70 (2009) (concluding 
that the Free Speech Clause does not regulate government speech, but noting that restrictions on 
government speech include the Establishment Clause, and electoral and political processes); 
YUDOF, supra note 1, at 214 (describing the Establishment Clause as “special: that clause is the 
only substantive constitutional restraint on what governments may say”).   
 174.  See Blocher, supra note 1, at 726 (referring to government speech as a “‘glaring 
exception to the First Amendment norm that the government must be viewpoint neutral’” (citing 
The Supreme Court—Leading Cases—G. Freedom of Speech and Expression, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
277, 283 (2005))). 
 175.  See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (finding that the 
Framers of the Bill of Rights objected to coerced forms of communication, including forcing 
children to salute the flag in school). 
 176.  Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977). 
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nature.  As the Supreme Court noted in Wooley v. Maynard,
177
 “where the 
State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to 
some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right 
to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”178 
Where petitioners are engaged in commercial speech, the 
government’s burden is lowered.  The Supreme Court defines commercial 
speech as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.”179  The line between commercial and non-commercial 
speech, however, is by no means easy to draw.
180
  Where commercial and 
non-commercial speech are inextricably intertwined, courts typically regard 
the speech as non-commercial in nature, and therefore hold that regulations 
on the speech are subject to strict scrutiny.
181
 
There appears to be some confusion among the lower courts as to how 
these standards should be applied in the compelled speech context.  In Riley 
v. National Federation of the Blind,
182
 the Supreme Court stated, “Our 
lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled 
statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect 
of the compelled statement thereon.”183  Absent government regulation in 
compelled speech cases, most district and appellate courts base their 
standard of review primarily on whether the speaker’s underlying speech is 
commercial in nature.
184
  Other courts instead select a standard of review 
                                                          
 177.  Id.  
 178.  Id. at 717. 
 179.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980). 
 180.  See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional 
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772–73 (1999) (explaining the lack of 
uniformity in defining these terms); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (noting that the boundaries between commercial and non-
commercial speech are “quite blurred”); Keighley, supra note 11, at 2365 (“[I]t is assuredly 
difficult to develop a precise definition of commercial speech . . . .”). 
 181.  Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
 182.  487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 183.  Id. at 796. 
 184.  See, e.g., Evergreen Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(finding that the plaintiff’s speech was not commercial in nature), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
No. 11-2735-CV, 2014 WL 184993 (2d Cir. Jan. 17, 2014); Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy 
Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 683 F.3d 539, 555 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the 
Pregnancy Center’s speech was non-commercial and thus subject to strict scrutiny), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part en banc, 721 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the court below granted 
summary judgment without making an adequate determination of whether the speech was 
commercial or non-commercial). 
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based on the commercial or non-commercial nature of the speech that has 
been compelled by the state.
185
 
A second point of contention is the extent to which the ideological 
nature of a speaker’s underlying message transforms the speech from 
commercial to non-commercial.  Some courts have determined, for 
example, that in counseling women against abortion, speech by crisis 
pregnancy centers constitutes non-commercial speech.
186
  This is in part 
because the centers’ counseling is “informed by a religious and political 
belief[,]” rendering it ideological in nature.187  That said, the Supreme Court 
has “consistently held that advertising does not automatically lose its 
character as commercial speech simply because it may do much more than 
propose a transaction or disseminate purely factual information.”188 
Regulations of truthful and non-deceptive commercial speech
189
 are 
generally subject to the intermediate standard of scrutiny first set forth in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New 
York, a case that challenged a New York ban on promotional advertising.
190
  
                                                          
 185.  In Stuart, for example, the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina found 
that because the ultrasound “speech-and-display” requirements compelled physicians to convey a 
non-medical (and therefore, non-commercial) message, the ultrasound law was therefore subject 
to strict scrutiny. 834 F. Supp. 2d at 431–33; see also Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 683 F.3d. 
591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that a regulation which requires crisis pregnancy centers to 
disclose whether they have licensed medical professionals on staff, and post a statement 
specifying that the local health department encourages women to consult with a licensed medical 
professional, compels non-commercial speech and should therefore be subject to strict scrutiny), 
aff’d en banc, 722 F. 3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. 
Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 970 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (finding that “[a]lthough physicians often have 
a commercial interest in a woman’s decision to get an abortion, the Act compels speech that is, at 
best, unrelated to a physician’s commercial motivations, and that is, in reality, likely to be adverse 
to those motivations”), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570, 575–80 (5th Cir. 2012) (outlining a host of 
reasons why the Act has greater commercial motivations than the court below recognized). 
 186.  See, e.g., Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 683 F.3d at 554 
(explaining that “[t]his kind of ideologically driven speech has routinely been afforded the highest 
levels of First Amendment protection, even when accompanied by offers of commercially 
valuable services”); Evergreen Ass’n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (noting that “plaintiff’s missions—
and by extension their charitable work—are grounded in their opposition to abortion and 
emergency contraception”). 
 187.  Greater Baltimore. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 683 F.3d at 554.  
 188.  Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 491 n.6 (1997) (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  Expanding on this point, the Court continued,  
[t]he concept of commercial speech would be reduced to a relic if the threshold for 
imposing strict scrutiny were reached simply because certain advertisements evoke 
vaguely nostalgic themes of indeterminate political import or because the 
hypersensitive may see the specter of sex in the film of a child eating a peach. 
Id. 
 189.  The state may freely regulate and restrict commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or 
concerns unlawful activity.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).   
 190.  447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
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Intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson establishes that a state may 
regulate commercial speech where the following four factors are present: 
(1) “the expression is protected by the First Amendment”; (2) the state can 
identify a substantial interest; (3) “the regulation directly advances” this 
interest; and (4) the regulation is “no[] more extensive than []necessary to 
serve [this] interest.”191  In a later case, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel, the Supreme Court considered whether the Central Hudson test 
would also apply to cases where speech is compelled, rather than 
prohibited, by the government.
192
  In Zauderer, the petitioner challenged an 
Ohio disciplinary rule requiring that attorney advertisements that mention 
contingency fees also disclose how those fees are calculated.  The Court 
described the case as dealing with “purely factual and uncontroversial 
information” about the nature of a commercial transaction.193  The Supreme 
Court found that an advertiser’s interest in not providing factual 
information is minimal, particularly where the state maintains an interest in 
preventing consumer confusion or deception.
194
  While recognizing that 
“unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements” might be 
unconstitutional if they chill protected commercial speech, the Court 
concluded that mandated disclosure requirements are generally permissible 
where the disclosures “are reasonably related to the State’s interest in 
preventing deception of consumers.”195  This test, which depends on a 
finding that the state’s compelled message is “purely factual and 
uncontroversial,” is seemingly consistent with Wooley’s prohibition on 
compelled ideological speech in non-commercial contexts.
196
 
Scholarly and judicial interpretations of Zauderer vary widely.  
Commentators and courts disagree as to whether rational basis review under 
Zauderer applies only when the state has an interest in preventing consumer 
deception, or whether the state may also compel speech to further other 
                                                          
 191.  Id.  While some refer to the last prong of the Central Hudson test as a “least restrictive 
alternative” test, I prefer to use precise language used by the Court, which requires that the 
regulation be “no more extensive than necessary[.]”  Id. at 569–70.  
 192.  471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id.  
 195.  Id.  This test is closer to rational basis review than it is to intermediate review.  Id. at 652 
n.14. 
 196.  430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).  See also Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 849–50 
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even in the commercial speech context, the state may not “require an 
individual to disseminate an ideological message,” but finding that an EPA education campaign 
did not fall within this narrow category of ideological speech); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 
272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “[r]equired disclosure of accurate, factual 
commercial information presents little risk that the state is forcing speakers to adopt disagreeable 
state-sanctioned positions”). 
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rational interests.
197
  Some courts and scholars interpret Zauderer as leaving 
open the possibility of analyzing compelled speech requirements under 
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard.198  Another debated issue 
is whether Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test applies only to 
speech restrictions, or whether it also applies to compelled speech.
199
  The 
Supreme Court has never directly addressed these questions, thus the 
resolution of these standards remains unclear. 
A final consideration in analyzing the First Amendment claims of 
compelled speech, unique to the pre-abortion ultrasound requirements, is 
the issue of professional speech.  Many commentators have noted that 
speech by professionals, such as doctors and lawyers in the course of their 
professional practice, differs in substantial respect from traditional 
commercial speech, and therefore should be treated differently under the 
First Amendment.
200
  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has provided very 
                                                          
 197.  Compare Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 115 (applying Zauderer where the purpose 
of compelled speech was “increasing consumer awareness of the presence of mercury in a variety 
of products[,]” rather than preventing deception), with Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 
521 U.S. 457, 491 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Zauderer is inapplicable where a 
speech mandate is unrelated to an interest in preventing consumer deception), and R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting Zauderer scrutiny in 
part because there was no evidence of misleading or deceptive cigarette packaging).  See also 
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081–82 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding 
no evidence of consumer confusion under Zauderer); Jennifer Keighley, Can You Handle the 
Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 
558–59 (2012) (suggesting that, “[r]ather than listing the various ultimate goals besides curing 
consumer deception that should qualify for rational basis review, the test can in fact be reduced to 
a much simpler inquiry into the state’s immediate purpose in compelling the speech”). 
 198.  See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217–21 (noting that “because this case also 
involves a compelled commercial disclosure, we . . . apply the intermediate standard set forth in 
Central Hudson”); Keighley, supra note 197, at 586–89 (arguing that “compelled normative 
speech” is not purely factual and uncontroversial, and therefore should be analyzed under Central 
Hudson intermediate scrutiny).  
 199.  See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 978–79 (2007) (concluding that the 
distinction between prohibition and compulsion is not of particular importance, and observing 
“[i]f First Amendment concerns arise whenever the state proscribes physician speech . . . , 
constitutional questions should also arise if the state corrupts physician speech by requiring 
doctors to transmit misleading information in the context of informed consent”). 
 200.  See Halberstam, supra note 180, at 772 (arguing that the professional “fulfills a more 
defined social role by offering specific knowledge and expertise to an audience that deliberately 
seeks access to such information and often to the professional’s judgment about a particular 
issue”); Keighley, supra note 11, at 2351 (proposing an alternative model of review for 
physicians’ speech under the First Amendment); Post, supra note 199, at 950 (“[I]n the context of 
medical practice we insist upon competence, not debate, and so we subject professional speech to 
an entirely different regulatory regime.”). 
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little guidance on this issue.
201
  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey is one of the few cases in which the Court has 
directly addressed the First Amendment protections available to speakers 
within the medical profession; however, the Court’s guidance is somewhat 
limited and arguably inconsistent.
202
  In Casey, the Supreme Court held that 
the physician’s First Amendment right not to speak is implicated “only as 
part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and 
regulation by the State.”203  The Court cited only two cases in support of 
this proposition: Wooley, which established a strict scrutiny standard for 
compelled non-commercial speech;
204
 and Whalen v. Roe,
205
which 
described physicians’ constitutional challenge to a statute requiring 
reporting of patient information relating to prescription drugs as “clearly 
frivolous.”206  Neither Wooley nor Whalen provides useful guidance with 
respect to the scope of professionals’ First Amendment rights. 
In outlining First Amendment standards of review, the purpose of this 
Article is not to suggest which standard is most applicable in the contexts of 
tobacco labeling and pre-abortion ultrasounds.
207
  Rather, its purpose is 
merely to determine whether any of the available standards for evaluating 
the constitutionality of compelled speech might take into account 
considerations of whether the compelled speech is aimed at triggering an 
emotional response.  The following analysis of existing precedent in the 
tobacco and ultrasound cases leads to the conclusion that these concerns are 
rarely considered in a consistent fashion. 
                                                          
 201.  Halberstam, supra note 180, at 834 (stating that “the Supreme Court and lower courts 
have rarely addressed the First Amendment contours of a professional’s freedom to speak to a 
client”).  
 202.  Id. at 874 (articulating an undue burden standard for regulations interfering with a 
woman’s ability to obtain an abortion).  For a general critique of Casey’s approach to professional 
speech, see Halberstam, supra note 180, at 834; Keighley, supra note 11, at 2351; Post, supra note 
199, at 979. 
 203.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
 204.  430 U.S. 705, 715–16 (1977). 
 205.  429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 206.  Id. at 604.  
 207.  The decisions in the tobacco and ultrasound lawsuits offer concrete examples of how 
courts choose between these various standards of scrutiny.  Compare the approaches taken by the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in R.J. Reynolds (rejecting Zauderer scrutiny in favor of Central 
Hudson) and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Discount Tobacco (applying Zauderer 
scrutiny), with those taken by the Middle District of North Carolina in Stuart (rejecting the Casey 
standard and applying strict scrutiny), and the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Fifth Circuits 
(applying Casey).  See also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About 
the Constitutionality of Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 
855, 858 (2010) (arguing that while “it is not clear what level of scrutiny should apply” to the 
tobacco cases, the same standard of scrutiny should be applied in both the tobacco and abortion 
contexts). 
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1.  Compelled Noncommercial Speech: Strict Scrutiny 
Of the four lawsuits that have resulted in substantive decisions in the 
tobacco and ultrasound contexts, only one court has determined that strict 
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review.  In Stuart v. Huff, the Middle 
District of North Carolina determined that the state’s “speech-and-display” 
ultrasound requirements compelled physicians to convey a nonmedical, and 
therefore noncommercial, message, and thus were subject to strict 
scrutiny.
208
  According to the evidence before the court, there was “no 
medical purpose for requiring the speaking or showing of this material to an 
unwilling listener.”209  While recognizing that the informed consent process 
may involve some commercial or professional speech, the court held that 
such speech was “inextricably intertwined” with noncommercial speech, 
and therefore subject to the highest level of First Amendment scrutiny.
210
 
Strict scrutiny requires a determination of whether the compelled 
speech at issue is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.
211
  
In conducting this inquiry, the court presumably might consider the 
emotional impact of the mandated message.
212
  If a state is seeking to 
persuade women to carry their pregnancies to term, compelling physician 
speech is but one of a variety of options from which the state may choose.  
If compelling speech is significantly more intrusive than other options 
available to the state, a court might find that the speech law does not satisfy 
strict scrutiny.
213
  Moreover, even if the state does succeed in demonstrating 
a compelling need for a physician speech mandate, the nature of this 
mandate may vary.  For example, the state may be required to choose 
                                                          
 208.  834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013); see also 
Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 683 F.3d. 591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that strict scrutiny is 
the appropriate standard for analyzing the constitutionality of the medical center’s abortion 
policies), aff’d en banc, 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion 
Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 975 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (finding that, in advancing an 
ideological agenda, the Act did not meet the burden of satisfying strict scrutiny), vacated in part, 
667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the court below erred in choosing to apply strict 
scrutiny).  
 209.  Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432 n.7. 
 210.  Id. at 431 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 211.  Id. at 432. 
 212.  In Stuart, for example, the state argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that the “state has an 
interest in protecting abortion patients from psychological and emotional distress and that this 
interest justifies the speech—and—display requirements.”  Id. 
 213.  In Stuart, the court found that the Act went “well beyond requiring disclosure of those 
items traditionally a part of the informed consent process,” and that, although the state may have a 
compelling interest, the Act did not survive strict scrutiny.  Id. at 431–32. 
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between compelling messages that are emotionally triggering for the 
listener and arguably ideological, and those that are more fact-based.
214
 
The District Court in Stuart did consider the emotional impact of the 
state’s persuasive message, but not for the reasons described above.  When 
passing its abortion ultrasound law, North Carolina identified its primary 
interest as “protecting abortion patients from psychological and emotional 
distress” related to abortion.215  Because the state, in defining its interest, 
explicitly highlighted the emotional state of patients seeking abortions, the 
court was called upon to evaluate the validity of using a compelled 
ultrasound law to further this interest.  In fact, the district court concluded 
that the evidence before it directly contradicted the state’s assertion, 
specifically finding that ultrasound requirements were likely to harm, rather 
than improve, “the psychological health of the very group the state purports 
to protect.”216  Because the compelled ultrasound law was likely to lead to 
psychological harm, the court held that it was not narrowly tailored to 
further the state’s compelling interest and therefore did not satisfy strict 
scrutiny.
217
 
Notably, the district court’s consideration of the emotional impact of 
the state’s message in Stuart was necessary only because the state itself had 
highlighted emotional harm in its discussion of state interests.
218
  Had the 
state not mentioned the psychological impact of abortion on women, 
focusing instead on a different interest such as reducing abortion rates 
overall, it is unlikely that the court would have looked to the emotional 
impact of ultrasound images in evaluating the law’s constitutionality.  
Nevertheless, those with ethical objections to emotional persuasion may 
have missed their opportunity to argue, as part of a strict scrutiny analysis, 
that the use of emotionally compelling images might not be a narrowly 
tailored means of achieving the state’s goals.219 
2.  Compelled Commercial Speech: Zauderer 
The two appellate courts that have considered substantive challenges 
to the FDA’s new tobacco labeling regulations have found that they fall 
                                                          
 214.  See Keighley, supra note 11, at 2386 (arguing that there is a heightened concern when the 
state uses “ambiguous ideological messages”). 
 215.  Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. at 432–33. 
 218.  See id. at 432 (discussing “psychological and emotional distress” in particular). 
 219.  See infra Part V.B.2. 
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squarely within the category of commercial speech.
220
  Both courts began 
their analyses by considering whether the regulations satisfied the Zauderer 
test for compelled commercial speech, which requires the state to 
demonstrate that the compelled speech is purely factual, uncontroversial, 
and in furtherance of a substantial government interest.
221
  The courts, 
however, diverged in their conclusions.  The Sixth Circuit, in Discount 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, found that the tobacco 
disclosures were purely factual and uncontroversial, and therefore that 
Zauderer scrutiny applied.
222
  In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia rejected Zauderer scrutiny on the grounds that the 
images selected by the FDA were not “purely factual, accurate, or 
uncontroversial.”223 
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, however, the courts 
also took differing approaches in considering the relevance of the emotional 
impact of the FDA’s messages.  Only the D.C. Court of Appeals found that 
the issue of emotion affected its resolution of the Zauderer test.
224
  
According to the court in R.J. Reynolds, the images selected by the FDA 
were not purely factual and uncontroversial statements, in part because the 
FDA itself conceded that the images were meant to be understood 
symbolically, rather than literally.
225
  The court further emphasized that the 
FDA’s primary purpose in conveying these images was to “evoke an 
emotional response”226 and that such “inflammatory” and “unabashed 
attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) . . .  certainly do 
not impart purely factual, accurate, or uncontroversial information to 
consumers.”227 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Discount Tobacco expressly rejected 
such an analysis when it concluded that the graphic tobacco labels do not 
run afoul of Zauderer’s requirement that disclosures be purely factual.228  It 
                                                          
 220.  See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 550 (6th Cir. 
2012) (stating that tobacco disclosures and advertisements “clearly fall with[in] the category of 
commercial speech”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d. 1205, 1214–15 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (concluding that disclosure requirements, which are appropriate when regulating 
commercial speech, apply to both cigarette advertisements and cigarette packages). 
 221.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985). 
 222.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 560–61. 
 223.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217.  
 224.  Id. at 1216–17 (holding that because many of the images at issue are simply attempts to 
convey emotional responses and embarrass consumers to quit smoking, these disclosures are not 
impartial and therefore fall outside the ambit of Zauderer). 
 225.  Id. at 1216. 
 226.  Id.  
 227.  Id. at 1216–17. 
 228.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 552 (6th Cir. 2012).   
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cited the Supreme Court’s rejection in Zauderer of the state’s argument that 
illustrations could be used “to play on the emotions . . . and convey false 
impressions.”229  The Court in Zauderer recognized that images “serve[] 
important communicative functions,” such as “attract[ing] the attention of 
the audience to the advertiser’s message,” and expressly foreclosed the 
argument that the compelled images might be prohibited on the basis of 
their emotional resonance.
230
  Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that 
disclosures promoting a “visceral response” do not necessarily fall outside 
Zauderer’s purview.231  The court wrote: 
 Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response, 
spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but that does not 
magically turn such facts into opinions.  As set forth above, 
whether a disclosure is scrutinized under Zauderer turns on 
whether the disclosure conveys factual information or an opinion, 
not on whether the disclosure emotionally affects its audience or 
incites controversy.
232
 
A dissenting judge, however, disagreed and argued that attempts to frighten 
consumers or “flagrantly manipulate [their] emotions” do not (in contrast to 
drug labeling requirements, for example) present purely factual and 
objective information.
233
 
The contrast between the two courts’ approaches suggests that there is 
a legitimate dispute about whether Zauderer’s “purely factual and 
uncontroversial” requirement can be satisfied when compelled speech or 
imagery is aimed at provoking an emotional response in the viewer.  As 
further developed in Part V.B.1, this Article argues that considerations of 
emotional influence are indeed relevant to the determination of whether 
compelled speech is factual and uncontroversial. 
                                                          
 229.  Id. at 560 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 230.  Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)). 
 231.  Id. at 569.  In other contexts, as well, courts have analyzed Zauderer’s “purely factual 
and uncontroversial” requirement by distinguishing between pure facts and subjective opinions, 
not between factual communications and emotional communications.  See, e.g., Video Software 
Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 965–67 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that video game 
packaging that includes an “18” sticker does not convey factual information); Entm’t Software 
Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (same); see also Dex Media 
West, Inc. v. Seattle, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287–88 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (rejecting petitioners’ 
argument that a compelled message informing residents of availability of an opt-out program for 
yellow pages distribution sent a normative message about the value of recycling yellow pages); 
New York State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, No. 08-Civ-1000, 2008 WL 1752455, at 
*9 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (contrasting compelled disclosure of calorie counts on fast food menus with 
an impermissible hypothetical alternative—a “statement . . .  regarding the relative nutritional 
importance of calories or whether a food purchaser ought to consider this information”). 
 232.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F. 3d at 569. 
 233.  Id. at 527–29 (Clay, J., dissenting).   
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3.  Commercial Speech Generally: Central Hudson 
If compelled speech laws fail Zauderer scrutiny, courts typically go on 
to analyze the laws under Central Hudson, the general test applicable to 
government regulation of commercial speech.
234
  The Sixth Circuit in 
Discount Tobacco understands the test as the following: Central Hudson’s 
intermediate level of scrutiny permits government regulation of commercial 
speech where the state can identify a substantial interest, the regulation 
directly advances this interest, and the regulation is no more extensive than 
necessary to serve this interest.
235
  If courts were to engage in any 
consideration of the impact of emotional persuasion, it would likely be in 
the third prong of Central Hudson.  One might argue, for example, that an 
emotionally compelling message is more extensive than necessary to serve 
government interests where less provocative messages could achieve the 
same result. 
The two appellate courts that have considered Central Hudson scrutiny 
as applied to the FDA’s graphic tobacco labels have not, however, taken 
this approach.  In R.J. Reynolds, for example, the court’s analysis of the 
second and third prongs of Central Hudson focused exclusively on whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support the FDA’s contention that the 
inclusion of graphic images on cigarette packaging actually resulted in 
decreased smoking rates.
236
  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded 
that the available evidence, based primarily on Canadian studies, did not 
support this claim and therefore the FDA labeling regulations failed Central 
Hudson scrutiny.
237
  In Discount Tobacco, the Sixth Circuit also focused on 
the actual effectiveness of the images when determining whether the laws 
directly advanced the government interest in the least extensive way 
possible.
238
 
In dissent, however, Judge Clay argued that “the inclusion of color 
graphic warning labels” was not a reasonably tailored response to address 
the harms the government sought to prevent because the labels were aimed 
at “flagrantly manipulat[ing] the emotions of consumers.”239  Thus, while 
one might expect courts to give some credence to claims that the display of 
emotionally compelling images is not a tailored enough means of advancing 
                                                          
 234.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
 235.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 522–23 (majority opinion) (quoting Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566). 
 236.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217–21 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 237.  Id. at 1221–22. 
 238.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 530–31. 
 239.  Id. at 528–29 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
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government interests, such claims have not met with success.  In Part V, 
this Article will argue that courts applying Central Hudson scrutiny to 
emotionally triggering compelled speech ought to consider whether the 
speech’s emotional impact causes it to run afoul of the third prong of 
Central Hudson. 
B.  Fourteenth Amendment Challenges 
As noted above, the federal courts that have analyzed substantive First 
Amendment claims against pre-abortion ultrasound requirements have 
opted not to analyze them under the compelled commercial speech 
doctrine.
240
  On one hand, in Stuart, the Middle District of North Carolina 
analyzed the “speech-and-display” requirements as compelled non-
commercial speech, subject to strict scrutiny.
241
  On the other hand, the 
Fifth Circuit in Lakey applied Casey’s undue burden test to resolve the First 
Amendment challenge.
242
  Indeed, both courts, following Casey’s lead, 
conflated the First and Fourteenth Amendment analyses in such a way that 
it is now difficult to disentangle the courts’ reasoning on the two issues.243 
The Supreme Court in Casey held that pre-viability regulations of 
abortion do not violate a woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to 
                                                          
 240.  See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 241.  See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431–33 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (explaining that, while 
the speech contained some commercial elements, the non-commercial elements meant that it 
would be subject to strict scrutiny), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 242.  Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–80 (5th 
Cir. 2012).  
 243.  As recognized both by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in 
Stuart and by various legal commentators, the analysis of First Amendment claims by reference to 
Fourteenth Amendment principles is incorrect as a matter of law.  See Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 
430 (“The Court in Casey did not, however, combine the due process/liberty interest analysis with 
the First Amendment analysis . . . .  It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court decided by 
implication that long-established First Amendment law was irrelevant when speech about abortion 
is at issue,
 
and this Court declines to so find.”); Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey 
and a Woman’s Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 595, 619 (2012) (arguing that the district courts in Lakey and Stuart erred in 
interpreting Casey’s undue burden standard as not altering “the Court’s normally high standard of 
review for compelled speech”); Keighley, supra note 11, at 2379 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s 
conflation of First Amendment and undue burden analyses in Casey); Post, supra note 199, at 
978–79 (same).  Indeed, it would be odd if a constitutional standard designed for Fourteenth 
Amendment violations overrode traditional First Amendment standards—particularly where the 
Fourteenth Amendment standard is the weaker one.  Consider, for example, an analogy to the 
tobacco-labeling context.  Could a court legitimately reject tobacco manufacturers’ First 
Amendment claims to compelled speech on the ground that the disclosure requirements satisfy the 
rational basis test that is applied to state interference with non-fundamental rights, like the right to 
smoke?  Such an outcome seems unlikely.  But see Gaylord & Molony, supra, at 619 (suggesting 
that the lower Fourteenth Amendment standard is more appropriate than the higher First 
Amendment standard in the context of pre-abortion ultrasounds). 
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reproductive privacy so long as they do not place substantial obstacles in 
the path of a woman seeking abortion, also known as the “undue burden” 
test.
244
  Casey held that a state may take measures to ensure that a woman’s 
abortion decision is informed, even if those measures express the state’s 
preference for childbirth over abortion.
245
  As long as the information 
provided is relevant, truthful, and not misleading, it will not constitute an 
undue burden on a woman’s due process right to reproductive choice.246  
The Court in Casey identified examples of permissible informational 
disclosures, including disclosures about “the nature of the abortion 
procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 
‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus,” as well as the procedure’s “impact 
on the fetus.”247 
The “truthful and not misleading” test established by Casey echoes the 
“purely factual and uncontroversial” test for First Amendment challenges 
under Zauderer.  Unlike the D.C. Court of Appeals’ discussion in R.J. 
Reynolds, which cited the tobacco images’ emotional impact as evidence 
that they were neither factual nor uncontroversial,
248
 courts considering pre-
abortion disclosure requirements have done so without reference to the 
method of state communication or its emotional impact on the patients.  In 
Eubanks v. Schmidt,
249
 for example, the Western District of Kentucky 
explicitly held that abortion consent brochures including color-enhanced 
and enlarged photos are neither misleading nor untruthful.
250
  In Lakey, the 
Fifth Circuit upheld pre-abortion ultrasound requirements as consistent with 
Casey, describing them as “medically accurate descriptions [that] are 
                                                          
 244.  505 U.S. 833, 876–78 (1992) (“A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the 
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.  A statute with this purpose is invalid 
because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to 
inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”). 
 245.  Id. at 872–73 (finding that, while states should provide a reasonable framework to help 
women decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, this same framework could also include 
regulations designed to emphasize philosophical and social arguments in favor of carrying the 
pregnancy to term). 
 246.  Id. at 882. 
 247.  Id.  
 248.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 272–73 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(explaining that the negative emotional response evoked by images such as a body on an autopsy 
table suggested that their objective was not to help consumers make an informed choice, but rather 
to provoke the viewer to quit or never start smoking). 
 249.  126 F. Supp. 2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
 250.  Id. at 459 (“Regardless of their size, photographs do not become misleading so long as 
the statutorily required scale allows an average person to determine their actual size. . . . The 
pictures provide an accurate rendition of the fetus at various stages of development . . . .”).  
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inherently truthful and non-misleading.”251  While the parties252 and 
numerous commentators
253
 had objected to the emotional aspects of the 
ultrasound, the Fifth Circuit in Lakey did not consider these arguments.
254
  
Even the Middle District of North Carolina in Stuart, which rejected the 
abortion ultrasound law as unconstitutional, failed to address the argument 
against emotional persuasion when discussing the distinction between 
“factual and informative” speech and “ideological or judgmental speech 
concerning philosophical, spiritual, or moral issues.”255 
Only one court, in a non-precedential opinion, has suggested that 
analyses of abortion disclosure requirements under Casey are lacking if they 
do not take into account the emotional impact of the disclosures.
256
  When 
commenting on the Court of Appeals’ 2012 decision to allow a challenge to 
the Texas ultrasound law to proceed, Judge Sam Sparks of the Western 
District of Texas suggested that the court missed an opportunity to consider 
whether other aspects of the informed consent process might pose an undue 
burden by virtue of their emotional impact.  According to Judge Sparks’ 
reading of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, even an “an extended presentation, 
consisting of graphic images of aborted fetuses, and heartfelt testimonials 
about the horrors of abortion,” would be constitutionally permissible.257  
                                                          
 251.  Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
 252.  See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 21–22, Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (No. 1:11-cv-00486-SS) 
(alleging that the Act inflicts emotional distress on women by requiring physicians, even against 
the patient’s wishes, to deliver a verbal description of the unborn child, display the ultrasound, and 
make the heartbeat audible); Complaint at 31, Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (No. 1:11-cv-0046-SS) (noting 
“information that the patient has declined to accept . . . will unnecessarily stress, upset, and/or 
anger her as she prepares to undergo a medical procedure”); Amended Complaint at 35, Lakey, 
667 F.3d 570 (No. 1:11-cv-0046-SS) (same); Second Amended Complaint at 32, Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570 (No. 1:11-cv-0046-SS) (same). 
 253.  See MITCHELL, supra note 89, at 4–5 (objecting to links between the politics of gender 
and ultrasound that make such images inseparable from notions of women and power); Borgmann, 
supra note 89, at 320–25 (explaining that ultrasound statutes force a woman to see her baby’s 
image and undermine her feeling of control regarding the profoundly personal circumstance of 
unintended pregnancy); Rocha, supra note 89, at 38 (objecting to the ultrasound as an emotional 
appeal that attempts to dictate how women should deliberate over the abortion choice); Sanger, 
supra note 79, at 396–97 (commenting that forcing a woman to view her ultrasound in order to 
change her mind about having an abortion is not an appeal to reason but rather an attempt to 
overpower it). 
 254.  See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 574–84 (considering instead, the appellees’ argument that the 
ultrasound requirement violates the First Amendment by requiring a medically unnecessary 
procedure to convey an ideological message, or uses unconstitutionally vague statutory language). 
 255.  834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 n.4 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 256.  Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012 
WL 373132, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 2012). 
 257.  Id. at *3. 
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This Article argues that Judge Sparks’ argument has merit, and discusses it 
further in Part V.B.3. 
V.  THE EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF IMAGERY CAN AND SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES 
Part IV explored the various standards of scrutiny that federal courts 
have applied when adjudicating the constitutionality of tobacco labeling and 
abortion ultrasound laws.  It also highlighted the few instances in which 
judges have taken arguments against emotional persuasion into account 
when applying these standards of scrutiny.  This section argues that, despite 
a paucity of consistent judicial recognition, there is room within the 
constitutional analysis of the tobacco and ultrasound cases to incorporate 
arguments that the state’s use of emotionally laden imagery in compelled 
speech contexts violates constitutional norms.  Moreover, it demonstrates 
that such arguments are, in fact, consistent with First Amendment 
jurisprudence relating to the use of symbols and images in speech. 
A.  Supreme Court Precedent Recognizes the Distinctive Power of 
Images in Its Free Speech Jurisprudence 
Language used by the Supreme Court in some of its most prominent 
First Amendment decisions reinforces the idea that certain types of image-
based appeals, when compelled by the government, may pose a greater risk 
of First Amendment violations.  Throughout its jurisprudence, the Court has 
recognized the unique power that images and symbols have over viewers.
258
  
While it has explicitly rejected the idea that words and images ought to 
receive different levels of First Amendment protection, a careful reading of 
its leading free speech opinions finds support for the notion that images are 
capable of more direct communication, and therefore more direct harms and 
benefits, than words. 
Amy Adler’s work on First Amendment law’s treatment of images and 
artwork is instructive in this regard.  Adler argues that First Amendment 
law “consistently and unthinkingly offers more protection to text than to 
image.”259  According to Adler, this preference, which is “often assumed 
but almost never acknowledged,”260 is based on the perception that visual 
images are more powerful, less rational, less controllable, and therefore 
                                                          
 258. See Adler, supra note 38, at 56 (recounting the Court’s acknowledgement of the visual 
symbol of the U.S. flag as being “ so powerful it may overpower the speaker”).  
 259.  Id. at 42. 
 260.  Id. 
 2014] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HEALTH CAMPAIGNS 503 
 
more dangerous than verbal speech.
261
  In support of this contention, she 
cites not only obscenity and child pornography laws’ focus on pictorial 
pornography, but also the Supreme Court’s treatment of symbols like the 
American flag.
262
  Indeed, a careful look at the jurisprudence in these areas 
reinforces Adler’s interpretation. 
1.  Images Are Less Rational, More Emotional 
Obscenity law, for one, routinely permits the restriction of image-
based obscene speech while leaving textual pornography unaltered.
263
  In 
the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Kaplan v. California,264 for example, 
a case dealing with a bookstore’s sale of non-illustrated books containing 
explicitly sexual material, the Court made such a distinction, albeit 
cautiously.
265
  The Court noted that statutory prohibitions on obscene 
expressions may be permissible under the First Amendment regardless of 
the “medium of the expression”—that is, whether the expression is pictorial 
or text-based.
266
  It also recognized, however, that restraints on the printed 
word are typically more difficult to justify; as Justice Burger wrote: “A 
book seems to have a different and preferred place in our hierarchy of 
values, and so it should be.”267  The Court did not explain precisely why it 
made this distinction, but Adler posits that the Court did so on the basis of 
                                                          
 261.  Id.; see also Amy Adler, The Thirty-Ninth Annual Edward G. Donley Memorial 
Lectures: The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 205, 217 (2000) (“Visual images are 
frequently perceived as more powerful and less controllable than verbal speech.  They do not fit 
comfortably within our current notion of a reasoned, rational marketplace of ideas.”). 
 262.  Adler, supra note 38, at 42. 
 263.  See id. at 52 (“Child pornography law governs only ‘visual depictions’ of child sexual 
conduct. Words can never be child pornography, no matter how gruesome and sexually explicit 
they might be.”); Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, A War over Words: An Inside Analysis and 
Examination of the Prosecution of the Red Rose Stories & Obscenity Law, 16 J. L. & POL’Y 177, 
189–91 (2007) (discussing a 2006 Western District of Pennsylvania obscenity prosecution of the 
“‘written word,’ i.e. non-pictorial works” and noting that there have been no prosecutions of non-
pictorial works since 1973); Robert A. Jacobs, Dirty Words, Dirty Thoughts and Censorship: 
Obscenity Law and Non-Pictorial Works, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 155, 176–177 (1992) (noting the 
infrequency of obscenity prosecution of non-pictorial works since Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973)). 
 264. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).  
 265.  See id. at 118–19 (explaining that although obscenity can manifest itself in the written 
and oral description of conduct, “a profound commitment to protecting communication of ideas” 
prevents restraint of textual expression). 
 266.  Id. at 119. 
 267.  Id.; see also Landau v. Fording, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966), aff’d, 388 
U.S. 456 (1967) (stating that “[b]ecause of the nature of the medium, we think a motion picture of 
sexual scenes may transcend the bounds of the constitutional guarantee long before a frank 
description of the same scenes in the written word”). 
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unspoken assumptions about the power of imagery.
268
  Furthermore, as 
Adler writes, “[Justice] Burger seems to envision the category of pictures 
itself as flagrant and debased,” which reflects longstanding anxieties and 
concerns that “images are lowly, sensual, and divorced from the realm of 
reason and ideas; they are so connected with our body and our senses that 
pictures become fused with what they represent.”269 
The Supreme Court has recognized the idea of symbols and images as 
bypassing rationality and short-circuiting reason in its compelled speech 
jurisprudence as well.  In West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette,
270
 for example, Justice Jackson expressed concern that requiring 
students to salute the American flag, rather than informing them of its 
meaning through more traditional textual communications, is merely a 
“short-cut” to bypass the “slow and easily neglected route to aroused 
[patriotic] loyalties.”271  The Court described symbols like emblems and 
flags as creating “a short cut from mind to mind” and held that compelling 
individuals to make gestures of respect toward these symbols violates their 
First Amendment rights just as surely as a compelled statement of belief.
272
 
Even outside of constitutional law, scholars have recognized that the 
law’s aspiration toward rational thought has effectively denigrated the value 
of images.  For instance, as Neal Feigenson and Christina Spiesel illustrate, 
American law “has tended to identify [] rationality (and hence its virtue) 
with texts rather than pictures, with reading words rather than ‘reading’ 
pictures.”273  Rebecca Tushnet likewise cites the arational power of images 
to explain why “[j]udges and scholars are powerfully motivated to disavow 
‘judging’” artistic images in copyright and other contexts: “Images seem 
especially dangerous because their power is irrational.”274  This focus on the 
arational power of images ties neatly into the arguments described in Part 
III against the state’s use of emotional persuasion. 
                                                          
 268.  See, e.g., Adler, supra note 38, at 46 (explaining that “the Court’s opinion was 
maddening in its failure to explain or justify its distinction between words and images” and that 
“deep but unspoken assumptions about both the meaning of the First Amendment and about the 
distinction between text and image underlie [Chief Justice] Burger’s assertion”). 
 269.  Id. at 47; see also Adler, supra note 261, at 210 (citing Catherine MacKinnon’s theory 
that pictorial pornography is more dangerous to women than textual pornography). 
 270.  319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 271.  Id. at 631. 
 272.  Id. at 631–32. 
 273.  Tushnet, supra note 117, at 689 (citing NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW 
ON DISPLAY 4 (2009)). 
 274.  Id. at 693–94. 
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2.  Images Are Less Controllable 
In its compelled speech cases, the Court has also expressed concern 
that the use of imagery to communicate substantive messages is troubling 
because images are inherently subject to various interpretations.  In both 
Barnette and Texas v. Johnson,
275
 state laws compelled adherence to a 
particular symbol—the American flag—and emphasized a particular 
reading of this symbol.
276
  The Supreme Court found both laws 
unconstitutional, and its reasons for so finding were very much tied to the 
unique power that images have over observers and the inappropriateness of 
the state’s reliance on this power to communicate a message. 
Echoing the findings of researchers who suggest that viewers may 
interpret images differently depending on their background and context,
277
 
Justice Jackson noted in Barnette that “[a] person gets from a symbol the 
meaning he puts into it, and what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is 
another’s jest and scorn.”278  Because viewers’ interpretations of a given 
image can and do vary, the Court held in both Barnette and Johnson that it 
is unconstitutional for a state to compel only one interpretation of an image-
based message.
279
  In Johnson, for example, the Supreme Court overturned 
the conviction of a man who burned the American flag in protest, thus 
violating a Texas law prohibiting desecration of the flag.
280
  In finding that 
flag burning constituted expressive conduct just as surely as speech, the 
Court highlighted the nature of the flag as a visual symbol—a “‘visible 
manifestation of two hundred years of nationhood’” and an object 
“[p]regnant with expressive content.”281  As the Court noted, it had “never 
                                                          
 275.  491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 276.  See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626–29 (1943) (noting that 
West Virginia law mandated that school children salute the flag and recite the pledge of 
allegiance, and allowed expulsion of children who violated that law); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399–
400 (noting that Texas law considered burning the American flag a sign of disrespect that was 
criminally punishable). 
 277.  See infra Part V.B. 
 278.  See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632–33; see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410 (stating that “[t]he 
State, apparently, is concerned that such conduct will lead people to believe either that the flag 
does not stand for nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other, less positive concepts, 
or that the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist, that is, that we do not enjoy unity as a 
Nation”). 
 279.  See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632–34 (explaining that the same symbols can be interpreted 
differently, and thus a symbol of nationalism will take on various interpretations for different 
individuals); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416–17 (noting that to prohibit flag burning for political 
purposes, but not for ceremonial purposes, would allow one to “burn the flag to convey one’s 
attitude toward it and its referents only if one does not endanger the flag’s representation of 
nationhood”). 
 280.  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399, 420. 
 281.  Id. at 405. 
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before [] held that the Government may ensure that a symbol be used to 
express only one view of that symbol or its referents.”282 
Indeed, public criticism of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Scott v. Harris
283
 seems grounded in concerns about singular interpretations 
of images.  In Scott, the Supreme Court relied on a video of a police chase 
as representing the truth of an encounter,
284
 effectively finding that the 
video “could be interpreted in only one way.”285  Rebecca Tushnet has 
argued that the Court’s failure to recognize alternate interpretations of the 
video “conflat[ed] the realistic with the real,” and that this failure led to 
erroneous analysis in Scott.
286
 
3.  Images Are More Powerful 
The compelled speech cases also reflect a sense among Supreme Court 
justices that visual images are inherently more emotionally powerful than 
words.  In her reading of the American flag cases, Adler describes the 
Court’s statements about the power of the flag as a type of “idolatry”—a 
belief that some symbols or images hold inordinate power beyond the 
power of words.
287
  In Johnson, the Court described the flag as “[p]regnant 
with expressive content.”288  Even Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, described 
the “mystical reverence” to which people hold the flag.289  Justice Stevens, 
also in dissent, likewise wrote that “[t]he value of the flag as a symbol 
cannot be measured.”290  The language used in these cases makes clear that 
the Supreme Court views the American flag as being a uniquely impactful 
representation of a system of beliefs fundamental to our nation’s history and 
progress.  The fact that a symbol can hold such power reinforces the idea 
that an image can do the same.
291
 
                                                          
 282.  Id. at 417. 
 283.  550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 284.  See id. at 378–81 (describing the videotape as the “added wrinkle” in the case). 
 285.  Tushnet, supra note 117, at 700–01.   
 286.  Id. at 701 (citing Dan Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris 
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009)). 
 287.  Adler, supra note 38, at 43–44. 
 288.  491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989). 
 289.  Id. at 429 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 290.  Id. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 291.  Regardless, there seems to be a contradiction in how the Court treats cases of image-
based speech.  In the obscenity cases, the Supreme Court seems to view the images as “devoid of 
any real meaning.”  Calvert & Richards, supra note 263, at 221.  Likewise, a dissent in one of the 
flag cases correlates the action of burning it not as an expression of an idea, but rather as an 
“inarticulate grunt or roar . . . indulged in . . . to antagonize others.”  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  As Justice Rehnquist noted, Johnson, a flag burner, could have 
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Adler ultimately argues that images, because of their unique nature, 
should receive greater First Amendment protection than they currently do—
that image-based pornography, for example, should be defended just as 
vigorously as textual pornography.
292
  If Adler’s argument is correct, then 
perhaps the converse ought to be true in the context of government-
compelled speech.  Because image-based communications are less rational, 
less controllable, and more powerful than textual communications, the 
Supreme Court ought to be particularly wary when state actors compel 
these communications.
293
  Indeed, the Court’s jurisprudence in the flag 
cases supports this argument.  In these contexts, at least, constitutional law 
has recognized the fact that images are a unique, arational form of 
communication and has treated the compelled use of images with less 
deference.  This history may suggest that there is some implicit precedent 
for affording emotionally triggering images less First Amendment 
protection.  Thus, when the government wishes to use such images to 
persuade, perhaps it ought to face a higher burden. 
B.  First and Fourteenth Amendment Standards of Scrutiny Can 
Accommodate Concerns About the Emotional Impact of Imagery 
To date, only one court, of those that have reached substantive 
conclusions about the constitutionality of the FDA’s tobacco labeling 
regulations and state pre-abortion ultrasound laws, has set precedent that 
takes into account the emotional impact of state-compelled imagery.
294
  In 
                                                          
expressed his opinion in many different ways, but it was his use of a symbolic image with which 
to make his point that suggested he should lose his First Amendment protections.  Id.   
 292.  Adler, supra note 38, at 43. 
 293.  See Tushnet, supra note 117, at 696 (noting that, “for example, victim impact statements 
used at criminal sentencing now may incorporate video, sometimes set to haunting music, with 
resulting controversy over whether such presentations irrationally influence sentencing juries”). 
 294.  In other contexts, too, courts have been unwilling to find that the emotional impact of 
speech is enough to render the speech less worthy of First Amendment protection.  In Snyder v. 
Phelps, for example, the Supreme Court asked whether the First Amendment prohibited holding 
Westboro Baptist liable in tort for picketing and making emotionally triggering statements at a 
service member’s funeral.  131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011).  It concluded that such speech, though 
hurtful to the family, was constitutionally protected.  Id. at 1220.  Because “any distress 
occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message 
conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself,” the Court held that prohibition of 
such speech was not a legitimate time, place, and manner regulation.  Id. at 1217–19.  While the 
case did not deal with either compelled speech or commercial speech, it demonstrates that the 
Supreme Court has not traditionally considered the emotional impact of private speech as relevant 
to its constitutionality.  Even in cases where the Court has considered the emotional harm 
resulting from commercial speech, its conclusions have not rested on the objectionable emotional 
content of the speech itself, but rather its impact on the industry the law seeks to regulate.  In 
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., a case evaluating laws that prohibit attorneys from soliciting 
clients within thirty days of an accident, the Court noted that “[t]he Bar is concerned not with 
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R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. Court of Appeals cited the inflammatory emotional 
impact of graphic tobacco warnings to support its conclusion that the 
Zauderer test, which applies only to purely factual and uncontroversial 
compelled speech, was the wrong test to use in this context; the court 
ultimately applied the Central Hudson test and did not further consider the 
issue of emotional persuasion.
295
 
The First and Fourteenth Amendment tests that apply to these cases, 
however, do offer numerous opportunities for considering the perils 
associated with compelled imagery that triggers emotional reactions.  Four 
such proposals, which incorporate supporting empirical evidence from the 
social sciences, are explained in further detail below. 
1.  Truth and Controversy 
Under the Zauderer standard, the state may, consistent with the First 
Amendment, compel “purely factual and uncontroversial” speech under 
certain circumstances.
296
  Casey interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to 
permit laws requiring physicians to communicate “truthful and not 
misleading” information that is relevant to a woman’s abortion decision, 
even if the information has “no direct relation to her health.”297  Where the 
communications in question are images designed to evoke an emotional or a 
rational response in viewers, as in the tobacco and ultrasound cases, the 
Zauderer and Casey inquiries—whether a compelled statement or image is 
factual (rather than opinion-based), uncontroversial (rather than 
controversial), truthful (rather than false), and fairly represented (rather than 
misleading)—ought to consider the unique characteristics of image-based 
speech. 
As the D.C. Court of Appeals noted in R.J. Reynolds, emotionally 
inflammatory images “cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to 
convey information” and “certainly do not impart purely factual, accurate, 
or uncontroversial information.”298  In dissent, Judge Clay in Discount 
Tobacco discussed whether the FDA’s graphic warnings were a “reasonably 
tailored” solution to achieve the government’s goals, highlighting the 
inconsistency between appealing to emotions by way of graphic imagery 
                                                          
citizens’ ‘offense’ in the abstract, but with the demonstrable detrimental effects that such ‘offense’ 
has on the profession it regulates.”  515 U.S. 618, 631 (1995) (internal citations omitted). 
 295.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 296.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 297.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
 298.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1216–17. Cf. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. 
v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 560 (6th Cir. 2012) (Stranch, J., majority) (“Zauderer itself 
eviscerates the argument that a picture or drawing cannot be accurate and factual.”). 
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and communicating factual information.
299
  Not only does the use of 
graphic images “evoke a visceral response that subsumes rationale decision-
making,” Judge Clay wrote, but the interpretation of the images will 
inevitably vary from viewer to viewer.
300
 
Judge Clay is correct in noting that images can be interpreted very 
differently by various viewers.  While the gruesome images selected by the 
FDA for cigarette packaging are likely to trigger fear and disgust in all but 
the most hardened viewers, not all images are as homogeneously 
understood.  Fetal ultrasound images are a primary example.  While 
proponents of pre-abortion ultrasound laws maintain that their goal in 
presenting women with ultrasound images and fetal descriptions is to 
inspire feelings of love and maternal bonding, women on the receiving end 
of this message have interpreted these images very differently.
301
  For 
instance, Dana Weinstein testified in Nova Health Systems v. Pruitt about 
her decision to choose abortion after learning that her unborn child had 
severe brain damage, which would cause it to be in a persistent vegetative 
state upon birth.
302
  According to Weinstein, “[h]aving to listen to a detailed 
description of the ultrasound images would have caused [her] to experience 
the shock of the diagnosis all over again and would have intensified the 
feelings of grief and disappointment that [she] was struggling to cope 
with.”303 
Indeed, scientific research has confirmed the fact that women 
experience ultrasounds differently.  Women experiencing normal 
pregnancies generally interpret the ultrasound event as a positive one; in 
contrast, some who experience risky pregnancies and subsequently miscarry 
report that they wish they had not seen the fetal image.
304
  Two studies of 
                                                          
 299.  See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 528 (Clay, J., dissenting) (comparing 
the attempt to analogize colorful graphic warnings on tobacco products with extensive textual 
warnings on over-the-counter drugs). 
 300.  Id. at 529–530. 
 301.  See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 47–53), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258742.  Corbin 
notes that ultrasound images reflect particular social and cultural meanings, representing a 
“portrait” of a wanted child.  Id. at 49–50.  Therefore, she argues, the government’s message 
“forc[es] doctors to tell women that their unwanted pregnancy should really be viewed as a 
wanted child.”  Id. at 50.  She argues, however, that “[t]his reading of an ultrasound image is 
neither inevitable nor universal” and “most expectant couples need help interpreting the fetal 
image.”  Id. at 49. 
 302.  Response in Opposition to Defendants’ and Defendant Intervenor’s Joint Motion to 
Strike Declarations of Linda Kerber, Ph.D., and Dana Weinstein, and Limit The Testimony of 
Marilyn Eldridge and David Grimes, M.D. at 5, Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (D. Okla. 
2012) (No. CV-2010-533), 2012 WL 381843. 
 303.  Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 304.  Black, supra note 88, at 49–50. 
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women’s responses to the possibility of ultrasound imaging prior to 
pregnancy termination likewise showed significant variations in emotional 
response.
305
  In a 2010 study from the United Kingdom, approximately ten 
percent of women seeking abortions requested to see the ultrasound image, 
often expressing curiosity or a desire to ensure they had made the right 
decision, and referring to the experience as part of the grieving process.
306
  
In contrast, almost seventy percent of the women said that they did not want 
to view the ultrasound.
307
  Of these, some believed the image would inspire 
feelings of sadness and guilt; others said that the experience would be 
unnecessary because they had already reached a decision—one woman said, 
“It’s not just my baby.”308  A 2009 Canadian study, however, found that 
slightly over seventy-two percent of women seeking abortions opted to 
view the ultrasound when offered the opportunity.
309
  Of these, eighty-three 
percent viewed it as a positive experience, reporting reinforcement of their 
decision and a sense of closure.
310
  Others reported mixed feelings; as one 
woman noted, “It was interesting but sad.”311 
This research lends support to the argument that compelled images are 
unlikely to satisfy constitutional tests requiring them to be truthful, factual, 
uncontroversial, or not misleading.  A contrast with textual messages may 
reinforce this point.
312
  A statement like “smoking can cause lung cancer” is 
difficult to misinterpret.
313
  While some listeners may overestimate the 
likelihood of developing cancer as a result of tobacco use while others may 
underestimate it,
314
 both groups would, if asked, be able to accurately 
describe the message they received (if only by parroting the words).  The 
fact that the message may have different effects on listeners’ subsequent 
                                                          
 305.  Compare Graham et al., supra note 83, at 488 (finding a majority of women did not want 
to see ultrasound images because it “could potentially worsen the guilt and emotional turmoil 
felt”), with Wiebe & Adams, supra note 82, at 99 (noting most women felt that “viewing the 
[ultrasound] did not make it more difficult emotionally”). 
 306.  Graham et al., supra note 83, at 485–86. 
 307.  Id. at 485.  
 308.  Id. at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 309.  Wiebe & Adams, supra note 82, at 99. 
 310.  Id. at 99–100. 
 311.  Id. at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 312.  See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(contrasting textual corrective statements about tobacco with the graphic images in R.J. Reynolds). 
 313.  Compare id. at 5 (noting that the defendants were aware of the “‘consensus in the 
scientific community that smoking caused lung cancer and other diseases’”), with R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he image of a man smoking 
through a tracheotomy hole might be misinterpreted as suggesting that such a procedure is a 
common consequence of smoking—a more logical interpretation than the FDA’s contention that it 
symbolizes ‘the addictive nature of cigarettes.’”). 
 314.  Corbin, supra note 301, at 36. 
 2014] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HEALTH CAMPAIGNS 511 
 
choices does not negate the fact that listeners would be able to agree 
between themselves as to precisely what message was communicated to 
them.  In contrast, tobacco users viewing pictures of diseased lungs and 
women viewing ultrasound images would likely have difficulty agreeing as 
to what factual message was being communicated by way of the image.
315
 
A second argument for treating image-based communications as 
potentially misleading is grounded in social science research about 
cognitive biases.  Some legal scholars have argued that when government 
communications “attempt[] to exploit mistakes . . . [or] intentionally 
exploit[] predictable cognitive errors,” they distort speech by being 
misleading.
316
  In addition, research has shown that image-based 
communications are more likely to trigger cognitive biases that detract from 
rational reasoning.
317
 
Because images grab one’s attention, people may give them more 
attention than they deserve—a prime example of inferential error.318  Rather 
than processing emotional and visual information systematically, people 
tend to rely on heuristics or stereotypes, cognitive shortcuts for processing 
information that simplify decisionmaking at the expense of reasoned 
judgment.
319
  In particular, vivid evidence leading to negative moods is 
especially likely to cause errors in reasoning,
320
 such as perceiving greater 
                                                          
 315.  See, e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 530 (6th Cir. 
2012) (noting that color graphics can be viewed differently based on individual viewpoints and 
ideologies). 
 316.  Corbin, supra note 301, at 17; see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 
35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 47 (2007) (“[I]ndividuals hearing emotionally laden communications 
eliciting fear or anxiety may be more susceptible to persuasion by that message.”). 
 317.  See Corbin supra note 301, at 26–27 (noting that the use of images in advertising to elicit 
“positive emotional responses . . . exploit[s] a distorting heuristic embedded in people’s 
decisionmaking”). 
 318.  See Gold, supra note 155, at 518 (explaining that when evidence is selected for trial 
based on its vividness, the jury is exposed to the “danger of inferential error because vividness is 
normally only vaguely related to probativeness”). 
 319.  See Neal Feigenson & Jaihyun Park, Emotions and Attributions of Legal Responsibility 
and Blame: A Research Review, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 144 (2006) (recognizing that 
emotions and moods can “affect people’s strategies for processing information” (emphasis 
omitted)); see also Joseph P. Forgas, Affective Influences on Attitudes and Judgments, in 
HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 596, 608 (Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R. Scherer & H. Hill 
Goldsmith, eds., 2003) (recognizing that “[w]hen people pay little attention to the message and 
rely on simplistic, heuristic processing . . . , the affect often functions as a heuristic cue and 
produces a mood-congruent response to the message”). 
 320.  Blumenthal, supra note 75, at 15–16; see also generally John Cryderman & Kevin 
Arceneaux, Does Fear Motivate Critical Evaluations of Political Arguments? Emotion and Dual-
Processing Models of Persuasion (APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/paper=1644637. 
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than actual risk.
321
  In the context of advertising by tobacco manufacturers, 
for example, uniformly positive images of happy smokers exacerbate 
optimism bias and distort perceptions of risk.
322
  Similarly, negative images 
presented by the government to counter these advertisements exploit risk 
biases.
323
 
Thus, there is merit to the argument that compelled image-based 
communications run the risk of violating First and Fourteenth Amendment 
constitutional requirements that such communications be factual, truthful, 
non-misleading, and uncontroversial. 
2.  Tailoring to Government Interests 
Both strict scrutiny and the Central Hudson tests for First Amendment 
violations take into account the strength of the relationship between the 
state’s interests and the means used to achieve those interests.324  Strict 
scrutiny requires that a governmental speech mandate be narrowly tailored 
to further a compelling state interest; intermediate scrutiny under Central 
Hudson requires that the regulation directly advance a substantial state 
interest in the least extensive way possible.  When considering speech 
mandates that incorporate emotionally triggering imagery, it is reasonable, 
and indeed necessary, to ask whether the government might be able to 
achieve its goals through more effective means or through means imposing 
less of a burden on speakers and/or listeners.
325
 
In his dissent in Discount Tobacco, Judge Clay argued that the use of 
“large scale color graphic[s]” intended to trigger “visceral response[s] that 
subsume[] rationale decision-making” is not a reasonably tailored response 
                                                          
 321.  See Loes T. E. Kessels et al., Increased Attention but More Efficient Disengagement: 
Neuroscientific Evidence for Defensive Processing of Threatening Health Information, 29 
HEALTH PSYCH. 346, 353 (2010) (concluding that “high-threat smoking pictures capture more 
attention processes,” while, at the same time, “caus[ing] more effective disengagement” that could 
lead to more defensive behavior and reactions in viewers); Richard L. Wiener et al., supra note 
156, at 235 (identifying a study in which participants “provided with information about the risks 
of an activity developed negative affect, which in turn led to increased perceptions of risk”). 
 322.  Daniel Romer & Patrick Jamieson, Advertising, Smoker Imagery, and the Diffusion of 
Smoking Behavior, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, & POLICY 127, 129 (Paul Slovic ed., 2001). 
 323.  Keighley, supra note 11, at 2387. 
 324.  See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 325.  See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (finding that “the 
availability of alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment’s protections 
for commercial speech” would be relevant to a Central Hudson analysis); City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) (“[I]f there are numerous and obvious 
less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant 
consideration in determining whether the ‘fit’ between ends and means is reasonable.”). 
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for correcting an information deficit among tobacco users.
326
  According to 
Judge Clay, different viewers can interpret images differently, particularly 
when they include a subjective component.
327
  This, combined with the 
FDA’s alleged failure to consider other options for achieving its interests, 
proved fatal for the FDA in Judge Clay’s Central Hudson analysis.328 
Likewise, in Stuart, the Middle District of North Carolina, applying 
strict scrutiny, held that even if the state did have a compelling interest, the 
statute was not “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”329  The court 
faulted the state for not considering other alternatives to the mandatory 
abortion ultrasound statutes that might nevertheless achieve the state’s 
goals, such as offering written information about fetal development or 
offering the ultrasound as a voluntary measure.
330
  These alternatives, 
according to the court, would be less burdensome to the physicians whose 
speech is compelled, as well as to the listeners subjected to unwanted 
images.
331
 
These judicial opinions offer strong justifications for why compelled 
visual disclosures, as compared to textual disclosures, might be 
insufficiently tailored to the state’s interests and therefore violate the First 
Amendment’s restrictions on compelled speech.  As noted by Judge Clay in 
his dissent, images are subject to a variety of interpretations, which makes it 
far less likely that most viewers will be persuaded to act in accordance with 
the state’s interests.  When viewers interpret a message differently, it may 
be difficult to demonstrate that the communication of that message is 
sufficiently tailored to achieve the state’s interests.  Thus, any inquiry into 
an image-based campaign’s effectiveness ought to begin by asking whether 
the campaign’s message is likely to be interpreted consistently by a 
heterogeneous population. 
For example, consider anti-drug advertisements that were criticized in 
the late 1990s for portraying drug use as sexy or appealing.  Frank Rich of 
the New York Times described one of the anti-heroin advertisements: 
In this elegantly shot display of high-concept Madison Avenue 
creativity, a young woman armed with a skillet angrily smashes 
an egg and then an entire kitchen to dramatize the destructiveness 
                                                          
 326.  Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 528–29 (6th Cir. 
2012) (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 327.  See id. at 530 (“Although elements of the color graphics requirement may remain 
constant, the underlying message that they convey will vary with the interpretation and context of 
its viewer.”). 
 328.  Id. at 529–30. 
 329.  834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 330.  Id. at 432–33.  
 331.  Id. 
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of heroin. . . .  [I]t sends bizarrely mixed messages.  The woman 
looks like Winona Ryder; she’s wearing a tight tank top; there are 
no visible track marks on her junkie-thin arms; and the kitchen 
representing her drug-induced hell is echt Pottery Barn, if not 
Williams-Sonoma.
332
 
If the FDA’s graphic tobacco images caused some people to consider 
smoking to be a more attractive option (which, admittedly, seems unlikely), 
the communications could hardly be deemed well-tailored to achieving the 
government’s goals.  Indeed, this seems to be the case with the abortion 
ultrasound images—studies show that some women interpret these images 
positively and others, negatively.
333
  Perhaps because the ultrasound image 
communicates no singular message, research has found that exposure to 
ultrasound images does not cause women to change their minds about their 
abortion decision.
334
 
Images are a form of speech subject to various interpretations 
depending on who the viewer may be.
335
  For this reason, predicting how a 
heterogeneous audience will respond when exposed to such images is 
difficult (though responses to some images may be more predictable than to 
others),
336
 and this may ultimately affect the outcome of the constitutional 
analysis.
337
  Given the emphasis federal courts tend to place on empirical 
evidence of effectiveness when deciding constitutional challenges,
338
 it is 
                                                          
 332.  Frank Rich, Journal; Just Say $1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 1998), 
www.nytimes.com/1998/07/15/opinion/journal-just-say-1-billion.html; see also Rebecca Cullers, 
10 Anti-Drug Ads That Make You Want to Take Drugs, ADWEEK (Apr. 29, 2011, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.adweek.com/adfreak/10-anti-drug-ads-make-you-want-take-drugs-131158.  
 333.  See supra Part V.B.1. 
 334.  See Wiebe & Adams, supra note 82, at 99 (finding that in a sample of 254 women who 
chose to view their fetal ultrasound before abortion, none of the women changed their minds about 
the abortion procedure). 
 335.  See Tushnet, supra note 117, at 692 (“The apparent reality of images obscures the fact 
that meaning always comes from interpretation.”). 
 336.  See id. at 694 (“[T]here are certain features of human perception that work in predictable 
ways depending on the perceptual input.”). 
 337.  See id. at 703 (“[B]ecause images implicate First Amendment considerations, it is 
important to understand whether images are meaningless or whether they have a meaning that 
can’t be reduced to words.  The answer determines their constitutional status, but that 
determination is extremely difficult.”). 
 338.  In the tobacco labeling cases, the decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the District 
of Columbia and the Sixth Circuit were ultimately based on the strength of the evidence relating to 
the effectiveness of image-based tobacco warnings in reducing smoking rates.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 236, 238.  The courts focused on the connection (or lack thereof) between 
viewers’ intentions to stop smoking and their actual behavior.  See supra text accompanying notes 
236–238.  Both courts agreed that there was evidence to suggest that viewing the images caused 
people to think about stopping smoking, but the courts generally disagreed as to whether it could 
be proven, as an empirical matter, that these thoughts translated into actions.  See R.J. Reynolds 
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reasonable to think that campaigns communicating factual messages more 
directly may be a more tailored means of achieving government goals than 
campaigns communicating through indirect image-based messaging.
339
 
3.  Relevance and Undue Burden 
When dealing with pre-abortion ultrasound laws in particular, there is 
yet another alternative for incorporating concerns about emotional impact 
into the constitutional analysis.  Recall that Judge Sam Sparks of the 
District Court for the Western District of Texas criticized the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision to uphold Texas’s abortion ultrasound law.340  In his opinion, 
Judge Sparks expressed concern that the Fifth Circuit’s broad definition of 
Casey’s “reasonable regulation” requirement would permit even “an 
extended presentation, consisting of graphic images of aborted fetuses, and 
heartfelt testimonials about the horrors of abortion.”341 
Judge Sparks’s argument that some types of emotionally persuasive 
appeals may violate a woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to 
reproductive privacy is persuasive.  Grounding this argument in the 
definition of reasonable regulation, however, seems unsatisfactory.  The 
Supreme Court in Casey explicitly held that truthful and not misleading 
information relevant to a woman’s abortion decision is constitutionally 
permissible, even if the information has “no direct relation to her health.”342  
That is, the Court expressly acknowledged that some types of information 
may be relevant for the purposes of constitutional analysis despite the fact 
that they are not, strictly speaking, medically relevant to a woman’s 
                                                          
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding the evidence insufficient to 
show a “direct[]” and “material decrease in smoking rates” (emphasis omitted)); Disc. Tobacco 
City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 566 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding the evidence 
“more than substantial” and the warnings “reasonably related to the purpose Congress sought to 
achieve”); see also Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 902 (8th Cir. 
2012) (relying on empirical evidence about the risk of suicidal ideation associated with abortion in 
evaluating a First Amendment challenge to a compelled disclosure requirement). 
 339.  One strong counterargument, however, is the fact that textual messages (which are often 
more direct) are not typically as effective as image-based messages.  Indeed, this is precisely why 
the FDA chose the approach that it did.  See Bennett, supra note 50, at 1925 (noting that the 
FDA’s use of graphic images on tobacco packages, rather than enlarging the already present 
textual warnings, was due in part to a concern that consumers either do not notice or do not 
remember textual warnings).  In such cases, an evaluation of the effectiveness of possible 
messages might suggest that an image-based message is indeed more narrowly tailored than a 
textual one or an image-based message that is less emotionally gripping.  See supra Part V.B.2. 
 340.  Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012 
WL 373132, at *3 n.8 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012). 
 341.  Id. at *3. 
 342.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
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health.
343
  Indeed, federal courts’ willingness to uphold state laws requiring 
that women seeking abortions be provided with information about non-
medical crisis pregnancy centers, child support, and paternity establishment 
support this reading.
344
 
Perhaps a better understanding of Judge Sparks’s concern is that 
Casey’s requirements of truth and relevance are inadequate to ensure that 
messages communicated during the abortion informed consent process do 
not impose an “undue burden.”345  Casey defines the undue burden test as 
“shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus.”346  For a law to pass scrutiny under the 
undue burden test, the means chosen by the state to further its interests 
“must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”347 
If we believe that free choice is rational choice, unhindered by 
cognitive biases or undue pressure from third parties,
348
 the case could be 
made that some truthful, not misleading, and relevant messages may 
nevertheless have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman’s reproductive choices. 
Recall that imagery and emotional triggers are often viewed as short-
circuiting the reasoning process.  While the precise neurological mechanism 
by which graphic imagery affects information-processing is unknown,
349
 the 
most common layperson’s explanation seems to align with Errol Morris’s 
and Richard Posner’s reasoning—that the emotional responses triggered by 
                                                          
 343.  Id. 
 344.  See id. at 968–69 (holding that the required presentation of the availability of paternal 
support and state-funded abortion alternatives was “rationally related” to a woman’s informed 
choice, even though the information presented was not medically relevant to a woman’s health); 
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that the required presentation of paternity establishment and child support was not 
constitutionally flawed). 
 345.  See Blumenthal, supra note 75, at 36 (arguing for a broader reading of Casey that would 
reject certain mandated disclosures as unduly burdensome, even if they are technically truthful 
and not misleading).  
 346.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 347.  Id.  
 348.  See supra Part III. 
 349.  See Karolien Poels & Siegfried Dewitte, How to Capture the Heart? Reviewing 20 Years 
of Emotion Measurement in Advertising, 46 J. ADVERTISING RES. 18, 18 (2006) (“Emotional 
reactions function as the gatekeeper for further cognitive and behavioral reactions.”); Feigenson & 
Park, supra note 319, at 144–45 (citing evidence about emotion’s effect on information-
processing); Forgas, supra note 319, at 599, 601 (suggesting that contemporary cognitive theories 
may offer more convincing theories of how affect impacts information-processing, especially as 
compared to “psychoanalytic [and] associationist explanations” and noting that “[a]ffect can 
influence not only the content of people’s attitudes and judgments but also the way they go about 
computing their responses.”). 
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vivid imagery “‘stop us from thinking’”350 and “short-circuit[] reason.”351  
Indeed, there is a large body of research to support the idea that emotionally 
arousing visual messages are highly effective.
352
 
Studies show that the brain processes images more quickly than it 
processes words.
353
  Accordingly, images trigger viewers’ emotional 
responses almost instantaneously.
354
  Research suggests that these 
emotional responses precede cognitive or rational responses, and that 
decisions affected by these emotional triggers (particularly moral 
judgments) are made intuitively and automatically, long before any 
reasoning or rationalization could occur.
355
  Recall, as noted in Part V.B.1, 
that emotionally gripping visual information has been found more likely to 
trigger cognitive biases and detract from rational reasoning.  Moreover, 
decisions made on the basis of emotions tend to be made with greater 
confidence, causing people to be “less inclined . . . to process information 
systematically, because they are more confident that they already know 
what they need to know to address the task at hand.”356 
If this research, which suggests that emotionally gripping imagery is 
likely to short-cut the process of rational decisionmaking and lead to errors 
in reasoning, is correct, then it may be difficult to argue that the use of 
                                                          
 350.  Tushnet, supra note 117, at 691. 
 351.  Posner, supra note 86, at 310. 
 352.  See, e.g., Julie L. Andsager et al., Questioning the Value of Realism: Young Adults’ 
Processing of Messages in Alcohol-Related Public Service Announcements and Advertising, 51 J. 
COMM. 121, 121 (2001) (finding that “realistic but logic-based PSAs were not as effective as 
unrealistic but enjoyable ads”); Annie Lang & Narine S. Yegiyan, Understanding the Interactive 
Effects of Emotional Appeal and Claim Strength in Health Messages, 52 J. BROAD. & ELEC. 
MEDIA 432, 435 (2008) (citing research concluding that “emotional messages, negative messages, 
and arousing messages are more effective than nonemotional messages” (citations omitted)); 
Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 20, at 4 (citing research that emotional associations 
elicited by “novel, personally relevant, or vivid examples and explanations” are more memorable 
and therefore more likely to influence behavior); Farrelly et al., supra note 49, at i41, i44 (finding 
that tobacco countermarketing messages that elicit strong emotional responses are more effective 
and appealing to young audiences, and describing a CDC study finding that advertisements that 
“‘graphically, dramatically, and emotionally portray the serious consequences of smoking’ were 
the most effective”); Tushnet, supra note 117, at 696 (discussing the “unique effects vision has on 
decisionmaking, effects that can’t be produced with informational pamphlets”). 
 353.  Tushnet, supra note 117, at 691. 
 354.  See Feigenson & Park, supra note 319, at 145 (discussing affective intuition theories); 
see generally R. B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 151 (1980) (demonstrating that affective, emotional judgments precede cognitive 
efforts and are made with greater confidence). 
 355.  See Zajonc, supra note 354, at 160–65 (discussing experimental and clinical evidence on 
affective reactions).  
 356.  Feigenson & Park, supra note 319, at 148.  This applies to some emotions, like anger, 
disgust, and happiness; however, other emotions, like hope, anxiety, and sadness, are associated 
with uncertainty and greater reasoning.  Id. at 147–48. 
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images in the abortion context is truly aimed at informing a woman’s free 
choice, as required by the Supreme Court in Casey.
357
  Even if an 
ultrasound image is deemed to be truthful, not misleading, and relevant 
under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Casey, it may still run afoul of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s protections of reproductive privacy if its 
emotional impact makes it more difficult for a woman to exercise free 
choice. 
4.  Captive Audience Doctrine 
A final option exists for incorporating arguments against emotional 
persuasion into constitutional analyses of the tobacco and ultrasound laws: 
the captive audience doctrine.  While the First Amendment does not 
explicitly recognize a “right not to listen,”358 the captive audience doctrine 
does permit the state, in limited circumstances, to protect unwilling listeners 
from messages communicated in ways that make them difficult or 
impossible to avoid.
359
 
This doctrine, based on privacy considerations, is quite limited in its 
application, however.  According to the Supreme Court, the government’s 
right to “shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it” 
consistent with constitutional principles is “dependent upon a showing that 
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable 
manner.”360  Where individuals can simply “avert their eyes” to avoid a 
message, courts have prohibited the government from intervening because 
those individuals are not sufficiently “captive.”361  In contrast, case law 
                                                          
 357.  See Corbin, supra note 301, at 17 (arguing that “compelled speech that attempts to 
exploit mistakes” or “intentionally exploits predictable cognitive errors” distorts public discourse). 
 358.  See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 
B.U. L. REV. 939, 943 (2009) (arguing for the recognition of a right not to listen). 
 359.  See id. (arguing that the captive audience doctrine is a “starting point for constructing a 
right against compelled listening”); Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not 
to Be Spoken To?, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 153, 193–95 (1972) (proposing general guidelines for how 
and when the government should protect people from speech); G. Michael Taylor, “I’ll Defend to 
the Death Your Right to Say It . . . But Not to Me”—The Captive Audience Corollary to the First 
Amendment, 8 S. ILL. U. L.J. 211, 211–12, 226 (1983) (describing a captive audience and 
proposing that the government intervene on behalf of an “unwilling listener”).  According to some 
authors, however, “the Court’s treatment of the captive audience doctrine has been inconsistent 
and limited.”  Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 85, 99 (1991). 
 360.  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).   
 361.  See id. (suggesting that viewers encountering an offensive jacket could “avoid further 
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”).  Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. 
Ct. 1207, 1219–20 (2011) (allowing protests at military funerals); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 541–42 (1980) (rejecting restrictions on inserts placed in utility bills 
mailings); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S 205, 210–12 (1975) (invalidating a law 
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suggests that the government faces fewer hurdles in regulating speech to 
protect individuals from audible and otherwise unavoidable messages, such 
as the sound of protesters outside an abortion clinic;
362
 the sound of 
picketing;
363
 or unavoidable intrusions into the home.
364
  In fact, an early 
Supreme Court case distinguished between tobacco advertisements on 
billboards and placards from those in newspapers and magazines on the 
grounds that public forms of advertising (as opposed to print 
advertisements) “are constantly before the eyes of observers on the streets 
and in street cars to be seen without the exercise of choice or volition on 
their part.”365 
One might expect plaintiffs in the abortion ultrasound cases to raise 
First Amendment claims based on the captive audience doctrine.  To date, 
however, the parties have not made such claims, and therefore the courts 
have had no opportunity to consider them.
366
  That said, the psychological 
principles highlighted above support the idea that emotionally compelling 
visual messages might, even if a viewer is able to “avert his eyes,” 
nevertheless run afoul of the captive audience doctrine. 
Because of the way the brain processes visual and verbal messages, it 
is much more difficult to avoid a visual message than a verbal one.  The 
brain processes graphic images more quickly than it processes words; 
therefore, messages conveyed in visual terms trigger emotional responses 
more quickly than textual or verbal messages.
367
  Further, empirical work in 
social psychology demonstrates that emotionally triggering appeals—in 
particular, vivid images—may have an inescapable impact on future 
                                                          
forbidding drive-in movie theaters from displaying films with nudity); Martin v. City of Struthers, 
319 U.S. 141, 148–49 (1943) (striking down an ordinance banning door-to-door solicitation). 
 362.  See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734 (2000) (upholding an abortion picketing 
prohibition as merely empowering citizens to “prevent a speaker . . . from communicating a 
message they do not wish to hear” by noting that “[p]rivate citizens have always retained the 
power to decide for themselves what they wish to read, and . . . what oral messages they want to 
consider”); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (upholding part of an 
injunction restricting protest noises audible within an abortion clinic, but invalidating the part 
restricting “images observable” from within the clinic because “it is much easier for the clinic to 
pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up her ears” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 363.  See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (upholding an ordinance banning 
targeted residential picketing). 
 364.  See, e.g., id. (calling the residential picketing in question an “especially offensive” 
intrusion into the home); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) 
(permitting the FCC to regulate certain types of broadcasting because broadcast media is 
unavoidable to some degree); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86–87 (1949) (allowing an 
ordinance that forbid the use of sound trucks in public streets). 
 365.  Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S 105, 110 (1932). 
 366.  See supra Part IV.A.1 and Part IV.B. 
 367.  See supra Part V.B.1. 
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choices, in part because they are more memorable and engaging.
368
  In 
layman’s terms, it is far simpler for a listener to avoid a verbal message, 
which requires increased time and energy to process, than a graphic 
message.  Accordingly, even if a viewer is not captive in a particular 
location (such a purchaser of cigarettes at a drugstore), he might be able to 
argue that the instantaneousness with which images imprint themselves on 
our brains is enough to trigger the captive audience doctrine. 
Consider, for example, laws requiring nutritional information on food 
labels,
369
 or requiring that people seeking loans be presented with a stack of 
paperwork describing the risks of borrowing money.
370
  It is relatively 
simple for a consumer to avoid these disclosures.  Food labels tend to be 
discreet and unobtrusive, and a borrower is free to sign loan documents 
without reading them.  Even patients considering medical procedures are 
legally permitted to waive their right to informed consent.
371
  If the 
consumer chooses to avoid this information, the state cannot be blamed for 
the consumer’s ignorance.  The graphic images associated with tobacco 
labeling and ultrasound requirements, however, are different in kind.  As a 
matter of course, it is much easier to avoid reading words and understand 
their meaning than to avoid looking at an image, even briefly, and 
internalizing it. 
Supporters of tobacco and ultrasound laws could argue that a smoker 
need not look at the package of cigarettes she is purchasing, and that a 
woman seeking an abortion can “avert her eyes” when her physician is 
displaying the ultrasound.
372
  But these suggestions are flatly unrealistic.  
When a color image composes fifty percent of the front of cigarette 
packaging, it is nearly impossible for a purchaser to avoid the image.  To 
avoid the ultrasound image and description, a woman seeking abortion must 
shut her eyes and cover her ears, much in the manner of a toddler throwing 
a tantrum.  It is for these reasons that a court might legitimately conclude 
that image-based emotional campaigns, even where not presented in a 
traditionally private sphere, violate the captive audience doctrine. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Ethical arguments against the state’s use of emotion to persuade have a 
long history, beginning with Aristotle and continuing through contemporary 
                                                          
 368.  See supra Part V.B.1. 
 369.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2006) (describing requirements for food labels). 
 370.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) (dictating required disclosures for mortgage 
transactions). 
 371.  Although, of course, a physician is free to refuse to treat a patient who does so. 
 372.  See supra note 72. 
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theories of applied ethics and deliberative democracy.  Recent research in 
the social sciences demonstrates that visual communications (in contrast 
with textual communications) are far more likely to attract attention, trigger 
emotional response, and influence action.  In light of these considerations, it 
is perhaps surprising that policymakers at both the federal and state levels 
have renewed their use of image-based health campaigns. 
This Article argues that the constitutional challenges facing tobacco 
and ultrasound laws can and should be bolstered by reference to these 
claims from ethics and social science.  While only one precedential court 
opinion has found that the emotional impact of compelled imagery is 
constitutionally relevant,
373
 an analysis of Supreme Court precedent in free 
speech cases suggests that there may be reason to treat compelled imagery 
differently from compelled text.  Although the Court has declined, in its 
prior analyses, to draw a firm line between images and text, its language in 
cases dealing with obscene images and patriotic symbols seems to 
recognize the unique dangers that image-based communications pose. 
In evaluating the challenged tobacco and ultrasound laws, there is 
reason to take into account the nature of the image-based communications 
and their emotional impact on viewers.  While courts addressing these 
challenges have applied a variety of constitutional tests—strict scrutiny, 
Zauderer, Central Hudson, and Casey—there is room within each of these 
tests to incorporate arguments about the emotional impact of images. 
Indeed, evidence demonstrating that various viewers interpret images 
differently is surely relevant to the question of whether a compelled 
communication is factual, uncontroversial, and not misleading under the 
Zauderer or Casey standards.  Likewise, the fact that images have been 
found to be particularly likely to trigger cognitive biases suggests that 
image-based campaigns may be more likely to mislead viewers than text-
based campaigns. 
The tailoring test used in strict scrutiny and Central Hudson analyses 
takes into account whether alternate means of communication might be 
more effective and impose less of a burden on speakers and listeners.  
Again, the extent to which image-based campaigns might be interpreted 
differently, depending on the viewer and her context, may certainly help 
answer the question of whether the means used by the state to achieve its 
goals is sufficiently tailored to its ends. 
Casey’s test for ensuring protection of reproductive privacy asks 
whether a given law imposes an undue burden on a woman’s free choice.  
                                                          
 373.  See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting application of the Zauderer test on the grounds that the compelled images were 
“inflammatory” and “unabashed attempts to evoke emotion” rather than factual statements). 
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Where laws are aimed not at informing free choice, but rather are aimed at 
using arational techniques to trigger an emotional response of which a 
woman might not even be aware, there is a strong argument to be made that 
the Casey test is violated. 
Finally, the First Amendment’s captive audience doctrine, while it has 
not been used in recent tobacco and ultrasound litigation, provides yet 
another opportunity for incorporating concerns about the emotional impact 
of imagery.  Research demonstrating that images have a near instantaneous 
impact on viewers in a way that text does not could be used to argue that 
viewers of unwanted images are “captive” to them, even if they are not 
confined to a space that has traditionally been viewed as private. 
The argument presented in this Article is, of course, necessarily 
limited.  The First Amendment protects citizens from government 
intervention, but does not impose direct restrictions on the government’s 
own speech.
374
  In the tobacco and ultrasound cases, it is only because the 
government’s messages are filtered through an unwilling third party that we 
even have the opportunity to evaluate their constitutionality.  Moreover, 
while government messages in the context of reproductive care are subject 
to the Casey undue burden standard under the Fourteenth Amendment, no 
such protections exist for government communications in other medical or 
health contexts.  In other words, it is a unique set of facts about the tobacco 
and ultrasound cases that even permits us to judge the content and means of 
these government communications.  For this limited set of circumstances, 
however, the argument that constitutional analyses ought to take into 
account concerns about the emotional impact of images is compelling. 
That said, public concerns about emotional persuasion in general, and 
the emotional impact of images in particular, are broader.  If we are worried 
about the government’s use of emotional imagery in compelled speech 
contexts, there are likewise reasons to be concerned in contexts where the 
government itself is doing the speaking.  Consider, for example, a recent 
anti-obesity campaign by the Health Department of the City of New York, 
which features a video of a man drinking a tall, refreshing glass of solid 
fat.
375
  The video concludes with the message, “Drinking one can of soda a 
day can make you ten pounds fatter a year” and an image of ten pounds of 
fat dropping onto a dinner plate.
376
  The fact that this message is 
communicated directly by the New York City Department of Health, rather 
than by an unwilling third party, is simply not relevant to the viewer.  Its 
                                                          
 374.  See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 375.  New York City Dep’t of Health, Are You Pouring on the Pounds?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 14, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-F4t8zL6F0c. 
 376.  Id. 
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effect on listeners—including groups of seasoned professors of health and 
public health law, who groaned with disgust when shown the video at 
conferences
377—is the same. 
For this broader set of cases, then, the constitutional constructions 
described in this Article will not be dispositive.  Where the government 
itself is using emotionally gripping images to communicate a message, 
challenges must be brought on policy grounds, rather than legal grounds.  
To that end, a forthcoming article by this author offers a broader normative 
framework for evaluating emotional and arational persuasion by the 
government; this framework can be used by policymakers to guide their 
decisions about state communications.
378
 
In the meantime, however, the legal challenges to the tobacco and 
ultrasound laws remain unresolved.  The FDA has announced its intent to 
develop new tobacco labeling rules that are more consistent with 
constitutional principles, and opponents to state abortion ultrasound laws 
continue to press their challenges in court.  This Article suggests that the 
emotional impact of the compelled images are relevant to their 
constitutionality, and that therefore both policymakers and courts ought to 
take these considerations into account when moving forward.  Ultimately, 
policymakers and courts will need to decide how much weight to give these 
arguments—as compared to, for example, utilitarian arguments about the 
effectiveness of state messaging—and it is by no means certain that the 
presence of emotional imagery will have a dispositive effect in any given 
context.  Incorporating these ideas into the constitutional analysis, however, 
is an important step for bringing contemporary constitutional jurisprudence 
in line with ethical arguments and empirical evidence about the psychology 
of human decisionmaking. 
                                                          
 377.  Specifically, the 2012 annual conferences of the American Society of Law, Medicine and 
Ethics, as well as the American Society for Bioethics and the Humanities. 
 378.  Sawicki, supra note 18, at 46–47. 
